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THE MISSING INGREDIENT: HOW OFT-OVERLOOKED MODERN 
CONFLICT OF LAWS PRINCIPLES WILL DICTATE THE REACH 
OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 
ALEXANDER V. MAUGERI* 
With the start of same-sex marriage in New York, fifteen U.S. states and the 
nation’s capital now celebrate a form of homosexual union, whether marriage, 
civil union or domestic partnership. Litigants and scholars—both in favor of 
and opposed to these legal statuses—have routinely claimed that in the 
absence of state-level Defense of Marriage Acts, these relationships must be 
recognized by other states for the full range of purposes including adoption, 
health and welfare benefits, taxes, and alimony, unless those states have a 
public policy to the contrary.  They claim this consequence follows because 
of the long-standing American legal rule that “a marriage valid where 
celebrated is valid everywhere.”  This article challenges this conventional 
account by arguing that this “place of celebration” rule—though the law—
only tells half the story.  That rule does require t h a t  a  state recognize an 
out of state same-sex marriage or civil-union as valid, but it does not answer 
whether a litigant may claim the various rights and privileges that a forum 
state confers in connection with its own marriages, unions, or partnerships.  
Same-sex legal relationships are new, but state-by-state variation in 
emoluments that flow from the institution of marriage are not. Ever since the 
conflict of laws revolution, most state courts have used modern choice of law 
rules to adjudicate claims to the incidents stemming from interstate variation 
in traditional marriage.  Bringing this analysis to bear on the same-sex 
jurisprudence reveals that, if precedents are applied faithfully, the practical 
reach of same-sex legal relationships throughout the fifty states will be more 
measured than proponents hope and than opponents fear. 
 
* A.B., 2007, Princeton University, magna cum laude, Woodrow Wilson School of Public & 
International Affairs; J.D., 2011, cum laude, Harvard Law School.  Law clerk to Hon. Leslie H. 
Southwick, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Aug. 2011–Aug. 2012.  The author 
wishes to thank Jack L. Goldsmith III., the Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law at Harvard Law 
School, for supervising this article and for awakening him to the field of conflict of laws through 
the course Law and the International Economy.  The author also benefited from a correspondence 
with Andrew M. Koppelman, the John Paul Stevens Professor of Law at Northwestern University 
Law School, during the preliminary research for this article.  The views expressed herein should 
be attributed only to the author in his individual capacity. 
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Of all the legal issues surrounding same-sex marriage, constitutional 
challenges tend to capture the lion’s share of popular and media attention.  A 
prime example is the 2010 case of Perry v. Schwarzenegger in which 
former Solicitor General Ted Olson and attorney David Boies, opposing 
counsel in Bush v. Gore,1 succeeded in persuading a California federal district 
judge that the “Equal Protection Clause renders Proposition 8,” defining 
marriage as a union of a man and a woman,2 “unconstitutional under any 
standard of review.”3  Yet, thus far, only a few federal trial courts have 
acceded to this view that the U.S. Constitution prevents state governments 
and Congress from limiting marriage and its associated benefits to 
heterosexual unions.4  Even if some federal courts of appeals ultimately 
agree, that perspective will not become the “Law of the Land”5  unless 
Supreme Court Justice Kennedy goes much further than he did when he 
authored Lawrence v. Texas in 2003,6 the Court unexpectedly promulgates a 
 
 1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 2. Throughout this article the term “traditional marriage” is used to refer to the state 
solemnized union of a man and a woman. 
 3. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010).  The Governor and 
Attorney General of California refused to defend the Proposition.  On appeal, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained it would reach the “merits of the constitutional 
questions presented only if [the] Proponents have standing.”  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 
1191, 1195 n.3, 1197 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011).  The Ninth Circuit certified the case to the California 
Supreme Court for it to decide whether the sponsors of Proposition 8 have an “interest that is 
created and secured by California law” that might satisfy the injury in fact requirement for U.S. 
CONST. art. III standing.  Id. at 1196.  In answer, the California Supreme Court held that when 
“public officials who ordinarily defend a challenged state law . . . decline to do so, . . . the 
California Constitution and the relevant provisions of the Elections Code” authorize the official 
proponents of the voter initiative to assert the state’s interest.  Perry v. Brown, 2011 WL 
5578873, *29 (Cal. Nov. 17, 2011).  Presumably, the Ninth Circuit will now conclude that the 
sponsors have U.S. CONST. art. III standing. 
 4. See infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 6. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy based his opinion for the Court 
invalidating a Texas ban on homosexual sodomy on the substantive due process doctrine.  He 
wrote, “[i]t is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the 
government may not enter: The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can 
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”  Id. at 578 (citing Planned 
Parenthood of Southwestern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)).  Marriage and its 
emoluments are quintessentially public and thus do not obviously implicate this conception of 
substantive due process, anchored in privacy.  Cf. Sherif Girgis, Robert P. George & Ryan T. 
Anderson, What is Marriage?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 245, 283 (2010) [hereinafter What is 
Marriage?] (“[L]egal recognition [of same-sex relationships] has nothing to do with whether 
homosexual acts should be banned or whether anyone should be prevented from living with 
anyone else.  [The] debate is not about anyone’s private behavior.  Instead, public recognition of 
certain relationships and the social effects of such recognition are at stake.”); Witt v. Dept. of the 
Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 2008) (identifying Lawrence as a case concerning the 
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fundamental right to same-sex marriage,7 or even more improbably declares 
that sexual orientation is a suspect classification akin to race and national 
origin.8  Barring those doctrinal shifts, the most significant legal contest over 
same-sex marriage will not involve matters of constitutional law at all. 
About 1,500 times each year American courts face a multi-jurisdictional 
controversy that requires them to determine which sovereign’s law should 
 
“right to engage in private, consensual, homosexual conduct”).  But see In re Golinski, 587 F.3d 
901, 904 (9th Cir. 2009) (implying that Lawrence could apply to the government’s denial of 
public benefits, with the caveat that “[t]he bounds of Lawrence’s holdings are unclear”). 
Though Justice Kennedy could marshal his Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), decision to 
invalidate same-sex marriage legislation under the Equal Protection Clause, three factors make 
that course of action unlikely.  First, he declined a similar invitation in Lawrence.  See Lawrence, 
539 U.S. at 574–75.  Second, even were Justice Kennedy to turn to equal protection, he may be 
influenced by Justice O’Connor’s Lawrence concurring opinion.  Writing separately, she 
explained that because 
[Texas] law as applied to private, consensual conduct is unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause does not mean that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and 
homosexuals would similarly fail under rational basis review.  Texas cannot assert any 
legitimate state interest here, such as . . . preserving the traditional institution of marriage. 
Id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).  Third, Romer invalidated 
the referendum at issue because voters purportedly had enacted it due to “animosity toward” 
homosexuals.  Romer, 517 U.S. at 634–35.  Conversely, a case can be made that “traditional 
marriage laws were not devised to oppress those with same-sex attractions.”  What is Marriage?, 
supra, at 249 n.10. 
 7. In invalidating a ban on interracial marriage the Supreme Court, in Loving v. Virginia, 
recognized a fundamental right to marry in the Due Process Clause.  388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).  Yet, 
this substantive due process holding plainly relates to heterosexual marriage.  See id. (“Marriage 
is . . . fundamental to our very existence and survival.”); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 
(1978) (“[A] decision to marry and raise the child in a traditional family setting must receive” 
fundamental right status); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987) (reasoning that Zablocki 
applied to inmate marriage, in part, because most would be “fully consummated”); see also Smelt 
v. Cnty. of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 879 (C.D. Cal. 2005), vacated, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 
2006) (concluding that the “fundamental due process right to marry does not include a 
fundamental right to same-sex marriage” because Loving did not grant “the unrestricted right to 
marry whomever one chooses”).  But see Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 994 (citing Zablocki, 434 U.S. 
at 388) (“Because [same-sex] plaintiffs seek to exercise their fundamental right to marry, their 
claim is subject to strict scrutiny.”).  Additionally, the Supreme Court has made clear that judicial 
expansions under substantive due process should be limited to rights “objectively, deeply rooted 
in this Nation’s history and tradition” and that courts must “exercise the utmost care whenever 
asked to break new ground” as to fundamental rights.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
720–21 (1997).  One Ninth Circuit judge recently admonished a district court for failing to follow 
this “‘established method’ of substantive due process analysis” in its invalidation of Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell.  Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, Nos. 10-56634, 10-56813, 2011 WL 
4494225, at *5 (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 2011) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring specially).  The Perry 
decision sidestepped the Glucksberg limitation by defining marriage as “committed relationships” 
without regard to the historical context of gender or procreation. 
 8. See infra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing equal protection). 
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apply.9  The majority of those cases ask judges to decide among the laws of 
the fifty states as litigants either travel or engage in commercial or other 
transactions across state-lines.10  Over time through the common law process, 
state courts have developed precedential methodologies, so-called choice of 
law (or conflict of law) rules to guide their decisions of what law should 
apply.11  It is this somewhat arcane discipline—not the equal protection or 
substantive due process issues that draw headlines—that will dictate the 
reach and effect of same-sex marriage among the fifty states.  Specifically, 
state courts will decide a multiplicity of choice of law cases in which same-
sex litigants seek to have a particular benefit, right, or amalgam of rights 
associated with their domestic partnership, civil union, or marriage granted 
recognition and legal effect by states other than the one that celebrated their 
legal relationship. 
These controversies are sure to arise because of the diversity of state 
policies toward conferring these statuses and benefits, as well as the diversity 
of statutory and state constitutional rules for the recognition of foreign12 
same-sex statuses.13  Today six states and the District of Columbia celebrate 
same-sex marriages,14 while another nine permit individuals to enter into either 
civil unions or domestic partnerships complete with full, or nearly full, martial 
 
 9. SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, WENDY C. PERDUE & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, CONFLICT 
OF LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 4 (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter SYMEONIDES 
ET AL.]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. These legal rules (also referred to as “principles of comity”)—as distinct from the 
substance of the law (i.e., elements of a tort, requirements for an enforceable contract, or the 
statutory age of majority)—dictate when “the courts of one sovereign should be prepared to apply 
the law of another sovereign.”  Id. at 3. 
 12. This article follows the common convention of referring to both out-of-state and 
international law as “foreign,” while referring to the law of the state where the court is located as 
“forum law.” 
 13. As discussed in Part II infra, not every state Defense of Marriage Act or Amendment 
(“DOMA”) contains an interstate non-recognition rule.  Many simply do not confer same-sex 
marriage and/or unions as a matter of domestic policy.  See infra notes 21–22 and accompanying 
text. 
 14. New York began officiating same-sex marriages on July 24, 2011 pursuant to legislation 
approved by a narrowly divided state Senate at the urging of the Governor.  Nicholas Confessore & 
Michael Barboro, New York Allows Same-Sex Marriage, Becoming Largest State to Pass Law, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2011, at A1.  The other jurisdictions with same-sex marriage are Connecticut 
(May 2008 judicial decision), Iowa (April 2009 judicial decision), Massachusetts (Nov. 2003 & 
Feb. 2004 judicial decisions), New Hampshire (June 2009 legislation), Vermont (May 2009 
legislation) and the District of Columbia (Dec. 2009 legislation).  Same-Sex Marriage, Civil 
Unions and Domestic Partnerships, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16430 (last updated July 14, 2011). 
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benefits.15  A number of other states provide a smattering of same-sex benefits 
that fall considerably short of the privileges associated with traditional 
marriage.16  Similar to other aspects of common law that can be overridden 
by statute, judicial choice of law rules can be displaced by the passage of a 
popular referendum, legislative act, or state constitutional amendment.17  In 
that vein, twenty-eight states have statutory or constitutional choice of law 
rules that withhold recognition for out-of-state same-sex marriages.18  Of that 
group the statutory or constitutional provisions of twenty states purport to 
deprive partnerships and unions celebrated out of state of any domestic effect.  
In each of these states courts will face the task of ruling on the interplay 
between these positive law enactments and the state’s judge-made conflict of 
laws precedents.19 
Yet more daunting still, will be the job of judges when a state lacks a 
statute entirely or when the enacted statute does not address the particular form 
of out of state legal relationship.  As an illustration, consider the State of Iowa 
(which celebrates same-sex marriages): it expressly recognizes out of state 
marriages yet leaves unanswered how courts should assess the validity of out 
of state partnerships, unions and other homosexual benefits.20  Approximately 
 
 15. The states offering civil-unions are Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, and Rhode 
Island.  Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships, supra note 14.  Through 
domestic partnerships, California, Oregon, Nevada, and Washington State provide roughly the 
full panoply of benefits ordinarily associated with marriage.  Id.  Hawaii’s Governor signed a 
civil union bill into law on Feb. 23, 2011, and the state will start offering unions in January 2012.  
Hawaii Gov. Signs Civil Unions Bill, Advocate.com, http://www.advocate.com/News/Daily_ 
News/2011/02/23/Watch_Civil_Unions_in_Hawaii/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2011). 
 16. See, e.g., Maine, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-A, §§ 1-201, 2-102, 2-103, 3-203, 5-309, 5-311, 
5-404, 5-405, 5-410 (2010); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. §§ 6-101, 6-201, 6-202, 6-
203 (LexisNexis 2009); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-22-101, 15-22-102, 15-22-104, 15-
22-105 (2009); Monica Davey, Civil Unions Approved in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at 
A19. 
 17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) (1971) (“A court, subject to 
constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law,”); see 
also Joseph W. Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit and the Evasion of Obligation, 
1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 15 (2005) (noting that under WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020 (2009), 
Washington Courts are explicitly ordered to disregard a same-sex marriage created and recognized 
in another jurisdiction); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES 137–48 (2006) 
(discussing the scope and reach of such statutory and constitutional rules). 
 18. DOMAWATCH.ORG, http://www.domawatch.org/index.php (last visited Aug. 3, 2011) 
(thirty-seven states have a DOMA of some variety). 
 19. See infra Part II for an analysis of how courts may approach legislative choice of law 
rules. 
 20. IOWA CODE § 595.20 (2009). 
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six states have not enacted any same-sex choice of law provision,21 and the 
statutory or constitutional choice of law provision of roughly thirteen others 
only pertains to same-sex marriage.22  Consequently, cases will arise in which 
these judges will need to rely exclusively on the state’s prevailing common law 
choice of law doctrine. 
It is clear that: 
[T]he established rule in American law regarding recognition of marriages 
contracted out of the jurisdiction has been to apply the law of the state of 
celebration to determine whether a marriage was valid, subject to the exception 
that, if the out-of-state marriage violates a strong public policy of the forum, 
courts of the forum state will refuse to recognize the validity of the marriage.23 
Nearly universally, scholars and litigants recite this principle and then proceed 
to debate whether a given state has such a public policy objection and whether 
non-recognition on that basis would be legally permissible, or normatively, 
warranted.24 
Yet this article demonstrates that to proceed in the analysis directly from 
“validity” to “public policy” would be a fundamental legal error according to 
the modern jurisprudence of the vast majority of states.  That approach is only 
warranted in the handful of states that still adhere to the traditional choice of 
law approach called lex loci.25 
 
 21. This group includes New Jersey, New Mexico, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, North 
Carolina, Rhode Island, and Wyoming.  DOMAWATCH.ORG, http://www.domawatch.org/in 
dex.php (last visited Aug. 3, 2011). 
 22. Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, 
Nevada, likely Oregon (see infra note 100), Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and West Virginia.  
DOMAWATCH.ORG, http://www.domawatch.org/index.php (last visited Aug. 3, 2011).  
Additionally, in New Jersey the statute law is silent as to foreign marriages though there is 
express recognition for civil unions and domestic partnerships.  New Jersey, DOMAWATCH.ORG, 
http://www.domawatch.org/stateissues/newjersey/index.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2011). 
 23. Lynn Wardle, DOMA: Protecting Federalism in Family Law, 45 FED. LAW. 30, 32 
(1998) (citing ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 221 (4th ed. 1986)); see 
also KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 86; Singer, supra note 17, at 14 (“[M]arriage that is valid 
where contracted should be recognized everywhere unless it violates the ‘strong public policy’ of 
the state that had the most significant relationship with the parties at the time of the 
marriage . . . .”). 
 24. Wardle, supra note 23, at 32. 
 25. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae The National Legal Foundation, Burns v. Burns, 253 
Ga. App. 600 (2002) (No. A01A1827), available at http://www.nlf.net/Activities/briefs/burns.htm 
(“Georgia follows the original Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws (1934) approach of lex loci 
in contracts and tort cases, . . . and has also followed this approach in recognizing marriages.  . . . 
[Thus,] [t]he First Restatement § 121 supports the general principle of lex loci, argued by 
[appellant], that a marriage that is valid where contracted is valid everywhere.”); see also infra 
notes 129–134 and accompanying text (defining the contours of lex loci). 
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Starting in 1954 with New York, courts openly began to abandon this 
traditional rule: first in contracts,26  and then for torts.27  By 1977, over 
twenty-five states had transitioned to new judicial choice of law principles,28 
and in 2003, only eleven states still adhered to traditional rules, with at least 
four wavering in their commitment to that method.29  The shift was so 
dramatic it  came  to  be  known  as  the  conflict  of  laws  “revolution.”30  
Judicial precedent from this modern era reveals that courts in states that had 
overruled the traditional approaches retained the marital-celebration rule only, 
at most, for the question of validity.31  When faced with claims for the 
incidents associated with heterosexual marriage and other statuses—such as 
the rights of an adopted child,32  paternity for custody purposes,33  or the 
tax treatment of spousal property transfers34—courts applied the modern rule 
of decision that was appropriate based on how the conflicts revolution had 
changed their jurisprudence.35 
 
 26. Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101–02 (N.Y. 1954). 
 27. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281–83 (N.Y. 1963). 
 28. SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 117. 
 29. Id. at 300–01 (Map 2. Contracts). 
 30. Id. at 113. 
 31. Compare Seth v. Seth, 694 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. App. 1985) (holding that 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) “criteria, and not the place of 
celebration test, should be applied to determine choice of law in a marriage . . . context.”) 
(emphasis added), with In re Estate of Chase, 515 N.Y.S.2d 348, 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) 
(relying on the 1910 Court of Appeals’ lex loci precedent only for the question of the validity of 
the status of adoptions, and not for the incidental questions). 
 32. Chase, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 349. 
 33. Hermanson v. Hermanson, 887 P.2d 1241, 1244 & n.2 (Nev. 1994) (eschewing, as “a 
traditional conflict of laws approach,” the rule that the law of the domicile at the time of the 
child’s birth governs the child’s paternity status, the court instead used the modern approach 
under which “the state whose law is applied must have a substantial relationship with the 
transaction”). 
 34. In re Estate of Lenherr, 314 A.2d 255, 258 (Pa. 1974) (applying a hybrid modern 
approach that analyzes both “significant contacts” and rival “governmental interests” to validity of 
marriage for the purpose of characterizing property). 
 35. The conflicts rules often referred to under the appellation “Different Incidents, Different 
Outcomes,” see KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 91–94, constitutes a dramatically different theory 
from that which this article asserts is most defensible in light of the judicial choice of law 
precedent of most states.  The “Different Incidents” theory is most notably espoused by Deborah 
Henson, see Deborah M. Henson, Will Same Sex Marriages be Recognized In  Sister States?: Full 
Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States’ Choice of Law Regarding the Status 
and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii’s Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE 
J. FAM. L. 551, 581 (1994) (declaring that “today, courts have little justification for denying 
claims for the incidents of [same-sex] marriage”), and critiqued by Barbara Cox, see Barbara J. 
Cox, Using an “Incidents of Marriage” Analysis When Considering Interstate Recognition of 
Same-Sex Couples’ Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 13 WIDENER L.J. 699 
(2004) (asserting that Henson’s approach insufficiently accommodates and promotes interstate 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] THE MISSING INGREDIENT 333 
It is the principal contention of this article that for judges interested in 
faithfully applying precedent, questions concerning the recognition of 
incidents36 pertaining to same-sex unions, marriage and partnerships need to 
be resolved with reference to the jurisdiction’s prevailing modern choice of 
law principle—as opposed to the “place of the celebration” maxim.37 
This article proceeds in five parts.  Part I situates the concept of judicial 
choice of law rules in the context of the normative and legal controversies 
surrounding the interstate recognition of  same-sex relationships, including 
those pertaining to the federal Defense of Marriage Act.38  Part II explains 
when and how state constitutional amendments, legislative enactments and 
 
same-sex recognition).  Henson’s “different incidents approach” is a twist on the conventional 
view (critiqued in this article) that place of celebration governs validity as well as incidents, 
unless there is a contrary public policy.  Henson, supra, at 560–61.  Henson’s twist is that she 
posits that to avoid recognizing any given incident the forum state must have a policy against the 
enjoyment of that particular incident.  Id. at 566.  In other words, a generalized policy against 
same-sex legal relationships would not displace the place of celebration rule in litigation over 
incidents.  Henson’s view represents a diluted vision of the public policy exception.  Id. at 555, 
581 (“This Article reviews the application of the public policy exception in past choice-of-law 
cases involving unpopular forms of marriages . . . .  This loophole . . . must be narrowed to reflect 
changing societal attitudes which tend toward greater tolerance for alternative family structures.”  
“[C]ourts have little justification for denying claims for the incidents of marriage . . . .”). 
Conversely, this author’s article seeks to explore the implications of New York University 
Professor of Law Linda Silberman’s explanation that a state’s “own policy against same-sex 
marriage may be such that it chooses [as a matter of domestic substantive law] not to privilege the 
relationship with any economic benefits, or it may decide that it only wants to withhold specific 
attributes, for example, the right to adopt.”  Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage: Refining the 
Conflict of Laws Analysis, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 2195, 2206 (2005).  This article contends that 
there is strong precedential authority for courts to use the choice of law principles developed after 
the conflicts revolution, originally fashioned in tort and contract, for incidents of same-sex unions 
and marriages.  See infra Part III.A–B. 
 36. These incidents “include family dissolution, adoption, domestic violence, liability for 
family expenses, taxation, health-care decision making, inheritance, the right to sue for wrongful 
death, eligibility for [state] welfare benefits, health insurance, and homestead rights . . . .”  
KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 94.  The Supreme Court has used the term “incidents of 
marriage” to refer “to the receipt of government benefits (e.g., Social Security benefits), property 
rights (e.g., tenancy by the entirety, inheritance rights)” and other privileges for which “marital 
status often is a precondition.”  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987). 
 37. But see Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 51 FLA. L. REV. 799, 
819 (1999) (asserting, without citation, that “[t]he conflicts revolution . . . bypassed choice of law 
rules on marriage. The rule in use today is basically the same one employed by Justice Story and 
Joseph Beale.  . . . It adopted the law of the place of the last act, the place of celebration of the 
marriage.”).  Fruehwald’s conclusion—as well as the failure by scholars and litigants to note the 
approach of modern choice of law to incidents—may be attributable to the fact that as to marital 
validity the Restatement (Second) and Restatement (First) counsel substantially the same 
approaches.  See Singer, supra note 17, at 14. 
 38. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 
U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
334 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX:325 
popular referendums bind the courts by displacing common law judicial choice 
of law principles.  Part  III  seeks  to demonstrate  how  the  judicial  rejection  
of  traditional  choice  of  law  principles, combined with the influence of the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, revolutionized the approach of most state 
courts to the incidents of traditional marriage.  This part sets forth the article’s 
central argument that, in order to comport with precedent, incidents of same-
sex marriage need to be determined based on the forum’s modern choice of 
law rule.  Part IV.A surveys case law on interstate recognition of same-sex 
marriage and civil unions and offers general conclusions about how certain fact 
patterns are being, and should be, resolved.  Across the modern choice of law 
states,39 the evidence reveals that courts recognize that the inquiry as to 
incidents is analytically distinct from the question of a union’s or marriage’s 
validity.40  Part IV.B considers the special issues raised by the incident of 
divorce—both with respect to foreign judgments and the question of whether a 
court should entertain petitions for dissolution of same-sex relationships.  
Finally, the article concludes in Part V by offering reflections on the 
implication of the foregoing analysis on the effect of the proposed marriage 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the reach of same-sex marriage. 
I.  ORIENTING JUDICIAL “CHOICE OF LAW” RULES IN THE LANDSCAPE OF 
NORMATIVE AND LEGAL SAME-SEX CONTROVERSIES 
A. Legal Background 
The modern history of interstate same-sex relationships began with the 
1993 Hawaii Supreme Court decision in Baehr v. Lewin.41  The Baehr court 
held that the state law, which permitted only opposite gender couples to 
marry,42  violated the Hawaii State Constitution.43  The decision prompted a 
significant political and legal controversy in which proponents of same-sex 
marriage argued that states  should  as  a  policy  matter,  or  must  as  a  matter  
of  U.S. Constitutional law,44 recognize other states’ same-sex marriages (and 
civil unions).  Congress responded by enacting the Defense of Marriage Act 
 
 39. This term refers to the roughly forty states affected by the conflicts revolution.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 29–30. 
 40. See infra Part III.B. 
 41. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 42. Id. at 48–49, 48 n.1 (interpreting HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1985)). 
 43. Id. at 59–63.  The court applied precedent on gender discrimination and did not hold 
that homosexuals were a “suspect class” nor did it recognize a “right to same sex marriage.”  Id. 
at 580 & n.33. 
 44. See generally infra notes 48, 69 and accompanying text. 
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(“DOMA”) in 1996.45  The legislation has two main provisions.  First, DOMA 
Section 3 “defines marriage for purposes of federal law as the union of a man 
and a woman.”46  This provision specifies that the terms “marriage” and 
“spouse” in the U.S. Code only pertain to unions between a man and a woman; 
its effect is that the thousands of legal incidents conferred on traditional 
spouses are not extended for the purposes of federal law to those individuals in 
civil unions or same-sex marriages.47  Section 3 has been widely regarded as 
compatible with the equal protection principles embedded in the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.48  In this area, the Supreme “Court has 
fashioned a framework of tiered scrutiny . . . [by which] [h]eightened scrutiny 
generally results in the invalidation of state action . . . [while] rational basis 
review generally results in the validation of state action.”49  And, all nine 
courts of appeals that have considered whether equal protection required strict 
or otherwise heightened scrutiny have “declined to treat homosexuals as a 
suspect class.”50  Though a few district court judges have invalidated Section 3 
 
 45. Defense of Marriage Act, supra note 38; see generally, Robert P. George, The 28th 
Amendment, NAT’L REV., July 23, 2001, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/211452/28th-
amendment/robert-p-george (discussing the Defense of Marriage Act). 
 46. George, supra note 45. 
 47. See Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 395–96 (D. Mass 2010) 
(explaining that these definitions “as set forth by DOMA, are incorporated into at least 1,138 
different federal laws”). 
 48. See, e.g., KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 131–33 (acknowledging that “an equal 
protection challenge to the definition provision of DOMA, standing alone, would be a hard 
case[,]” although suggesting the provision might be “impermissibly discriminatory” and “rest[] on 
a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group”).  Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment that 
applies to the States, the Fifth Amendment has no Equal Protection Clause.  Cook v. Gates, 528 
F.3d 42, 60 n.11 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).  
Nonetheless, “the due process clause has been interpreted to include an equal protection 
component.”  Id. 
 49. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 755–56 (2011). 
 50. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 
2004); accord High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 572 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (“homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater 
than rational basis scrutiny under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause . . . 
.”), enforced, Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 821 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining that 
the High Tech “holding was not disturbed by Lawrence, which declined to address equal 
protection”); Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Brunning, 455 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2006); Nabozny v. 
Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 458 (7th Cir. 1996); Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 
F.3d 289, 292–94 (6th Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 532 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(“Neither the Supreme Court nor [the Fifth Circuit] has recognized sexual orientation as a suspect 
classification or protected group . . . .”); Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 732 (4th Cir. 2002); 
Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008) (declining to read either Romer or Lawrence “as 
recognizing homosexuals as a suspect class for equal protection purposes”); Steffan v. Perry, 41 
F.3d 677, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
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under the highly deferential rational basis standard of review,51 these opinions 
can fairly be classified as outside the legal mainstream.52  Against the 
“substantial circuit court authority,” the Obama Justice Department presently is 
seeking to persuade district judges, and ultimately the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, that the equal protection analysis should feature “heightened 
scrutiny” for any “classification based on sexual orientation.”53  Even if these 
efforts prompt a circuit-split, the odds are remote that the Supreme Court will 
place homosexuality alongside race or gender as a suspect or quasi-suspect 
classification.54 
 
 51. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 387 (invaliding DOMA Section 3 under rational basis review); 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (same); cf. Dragovich v. 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 764 F.Supp.2d 1178, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying government’s 
motion to dismiss because “Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim that section three of the 
DOMA bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.”); In re Golinski, 587 
F.3d 901, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2009) (Ninth Circuit deploying the canon of constitutional avoidance 
to interpret benefits statute relative to “hard question” of whether “DOMA’s sweeping 
classification has a proper legislative end”); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (companion case to Gill in which the same trial 
judge ruled that DOMA also violated the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause, U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8). 
 52. See, e.g., Letter from Eric Holder, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., to John Boehner, Speaker, U.S. 
House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/Feb 
ruary/11-ag-223.html (explaining that the Obama Administration “has defended Section 3 in 
jurisdictions where circuit courts have already held that classifications based on sexual orientation 
are subject to rational basis review . . . .”); 156 CONG. REC. S6613 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2010) 
(statement of Sen. Kyl) (criticizing the district court decision in Gill as “judicial activism”); cf. 
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (explaining that the “legislature that creates [a classification] 
need not actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification. 
Instead, a classification must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any 
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 53. Letter from Eric Holder, Jr., supra note 52; see also What is Marriage?, supra note 6 
(discussing animus and equal protection). 
 54. Perhaps the most compelling reason to think that the Supreme Court will not rule as such 
is Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  There he opted to 
apply rational basis scrutiny (albeit a variant) to a classification concerning sexual orientation.  It 
is true that in addition to legislative distinctions implicating suspect classifications, the Supreme 
Court also applies strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause when a classification 
“burdens a fundamental right.”  Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997).  Yet, because “this 
provision creates no substantive rights,” an equal protection route to heightened scrutiny is nearly 
foreclosed by the Court’s Glucksberg opinion for the same reasons we would not expect the 
Court to announce a new substantive due process right to same-sex marriage.  Id; see also What is 
Marriage?, supra note 6; Lofton, 358 F.3d at 816–18 (in light of Glucksberg, first deciding to be 
“particularly hesitant to infer a new fundamental liberty interest” concerning homosexuality under 
substantive due process and second carrying the absence of such as interest into its equal 
protection determination that state law limiting adoption to heterosexual parents “burden[ed] no 
fundamental right”); but cf. Witt, 527 F.3d at 817–18 (concluding that substantive due process 
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Congress’s second concern in enacting DOMA was that courts might 
interpret the Full Faith and Credit Clause (found in Article IV, Section 1 of the 
U.S. Constitution)55 to mandate interstate recognition of Hawaiian (or future 
states’) same-sex marriages.56  To that end, the legislation provides “that no 
state is required to recognize another state’s same-sex marriage.”57  This aspect 
of DOMA assumes arguendo that full faith and credit would mandate out-of-
state recognition of marital status and its incidents,58 and purports to use 
Congress’s power under the Article IV Effects Clause “to make exceptions to 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”59 
Scholars disagree about whether Congress has this power.  Professors 
Lynn Wardle and Gillian Metzger both argue that DOMA’s choice of law 
provision—both with regard to the status and incidents of marriage, and with 
regard to judgments—is within Congress’s authority, and that the law does not 
offend Article IV.60  By contrast, Professor Joseph Singer argues that the 
existing precedent from the Supreme Court on the dormant Commerce 
Clause—and the same Article IV precedent analyzed by Wardle—suggest that 
Congress cannot “pass a law decreasing the obligations states have to give Full 
Faith and Credit to the laws and judgments of other states.”61 
 
claims that fall within the ambit of Lawrence call for “a heightened level of scrutiny,” although 
not strict scrutiny).  The Witt decision does not directly contradict the analysis of this author or of 
the Eleventh Circuit if Lawrence’s application is confined (properly) to laws burdening private 
homosexual conduct.  Cf. What is Marriage?, supra note 6. 
 55. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.  And the Congress may by general 
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and 
the Effect thereof.”). 
 56. Singer, supra note 17, at 35 (making the case that full faith and credit compels just that). 
 57. George, supra note 45, at 33. 
 58. See generally Singer, supra note 17, at 35. 
 59. George, supra note 45, at 33.  DOMA also invites states to extend non-recognition to 
other state’s judgments pertaining to same-sex relationships.  Id.  Many scholars who perceive 
DOMA as superfluous (i.e., states can adopt any marriage recognition rule they choose with or 
without it), do contend that non-recognition of judgments is unconstitutional.  See, e.g., 
KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 117–23 (arguing that although “[s]tates have always had the 
power to decline to recognize marriages from other states, and they have been exercising that 
power for centuries[,] . . . DOMA plainly alters preexisting law . . . with respect to judgments.”). 
 60. Wardle, supra note 23, at 33; Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, Divorce 
Recognition, and Same-Sex Marriage Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 187, 220, 226 (1998) 
(concluding that DOMA is “consistent with the principles established in the Williams[, I and II,] 
cases”); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1468, 1533–34 (2007) (analyzing Article IV in terms of vertical and horizontal constitutional 
structure and determining that DOMA “represents a rational regulation of interstate relations that 
accords with the terms of the Effects Clause and with principles of federalism.”). 
 61. Singer, supra note 17, at 35–44.  Singer animates his contention, in part, with analogies 
to two “other cases in which the Supreme Court has identified a single state whose law is entitled 
to recognition by other states . . . .”  Id. at 35.  The first case is Williams v. North Carolina, 317 
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Whether Congress can alleviate obligations under the so-called Effects 
Clause of Article IV,62 is likely an academic matter though.  Although Singer 
additionally posits that the U.S. Constitution requires all states to adhere to a 
lex loci celebrationis rule for marriage and its incidents,63 no federal court and 
virtually no state court64 has  ever interpreted the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
in that manner.65  Additionally, the Supreme Court, in Sun Oil. Co. v. 
Wortman, held that “[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel a state 
to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a 
subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.”66  In light of the 
substantial likelihood that states are not constitutionally constrained from using 
 
U.S. 287 (1942) (“Williams I”), holding that the Constitution requires states to recognize divorce 
judgments of other states.  The second case is CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 
U.S. 69 (1987), a case that Singer argues, “came very close to holding that the [dormant] 
Commerce Clause prohibits applying any law other than the law of the place of incorporation to 
determine the voting rights of [corporate] shareholders . . . .”  Singer, supra note 17, at 41; but see 
KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 118–20 (disagreeing that the “full faith and credit clause . . . 
constrain[s] states’ power to fashion choice of law rules” except with respect to the International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), due process minimum contacts requirement). 
 62. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1 (“And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in 
which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.”). 
 63. Singer, supra note 17, at 35 (contending that the Full Faith and Credit Clause when 
“construed in light of other constitutional norms, including . . . the Commerce Clause, the 
constitutional right to travel, the Takings Clause, the First Amendment, and the fundamental right 
to marry” arguably imposes a “place of celebration [choice of law] rule”). 
 64. KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 185 n.11 (discussing a few Louisiana state intermediate 
appellate courts interpreting Article IV in this fashion).  Yet, in Maradiago v. Castle, Nos. 07-
9414, 07-9437, 2008 WL 4681383, at *2–3 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 2008), a federal district court 
reasoned that even under Louisiana’s unique interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a 
statutory “strong public policy,” such as state’s DOMA, would nonetheless defeat any imperative 
to recognize a foreign same-sex marriage. 
 65. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 118 (“[T]he full faith and credit clause has never 
been much of a constraint on states’ power to fashion choice of law rules.”); see also The Defense 
of Marriage Act: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 44 (1996) (statement of Cass R. Sunstein, Professor of Jurisprudence, Univ. of Chi.) 
(testifying that the “clause has never been understood to bind the states” to “recognize marriages 
that violate their policies and judgment.”  “For [over] two hundred years states have worked out 
issues of this kind on their own.”); cf. infra Part III (describing the approach of modern choice of 
law jurisdictions to marital incidents). 
 66. 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (quoting Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident 
Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also LEA BRILMAYER 
& JACK GOLDSMITH, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 392 (5th ed. 2002) (“[Sun Oil 
v.] Wortman must surely make one thing even clearer: that with regard to the issue of whether an 
adequate nexus exists for application of local law, the due process and full faith and credit limits 
are identical.”). 
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any choice of law rules they wish, this article assumes the point for the purpose 
of most of its analysis and conclusions.67 
B. Normative Background 
The legal contests concerning same-sex marriage and civil unions arise in 
the context of a pitched ethical battle between defenders of traditional 
marriage,68 and those who contend that states have no rational, non-
discriminatory justification for withholding these statuses or their incidents 
from same-sex couples.69  When a forum court confronts the question of 
whether to recognize the benefits and privileges conferred by another 
jurisdiction, the litigants likely will have, publicly or in briefing, made appeal 
to the two sides of the moral debate.  However, presumably, legal scholars 
with affinities for and against recognition all share the aspiration articulated by 
conflict of laws scholar Andrew Koppelman: “Whatever external political 
pressures courts may face, they will always, one hopes, feel some obligation to 
just do their jobs and follow the law.”70 
After surveying the judicial opinions on interstate recognition, since the 
advent of same-sex unions in 2000 in Vermont71 and the 2004 inauguration of 
 
 67. But see infra Part IV.B (analyzing the possibility of full, faith and credit complications 
with respect to DOMA’s invitation to states not to recognize same-sex judgments). 
 68. See, e.g., Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 
84 GEO. L.J. 301 (1995); John Finnis, The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual 
Relations, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 97 (1997) (Finnis, George, and Bradley articulate what is known as a 
“New Natural Law” ethical critique); Maggie Gallagher, Normal Marriage: Two Views, in 
MARRIAGE AND SAME SEX UNIONS : A DEBATE 13, 21 (Lynn Wardle et al. eds., 2003) 
(articulating perceived consequentialist harms from the perspective that “children do just fine in 
whatever family forms their parents choose to create, and that babies are irrelevant to the public 
purposes of marriage.”); What is Marriage?, supra note 6, at 245 (explaining the conjugal union 
of man and woman as the raison d’etre for marriage). 
 69. See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261 
(1995); Andrew Koppelman, The Decline and Fall of the Case Against Same-Sex Marriage, 2 U. 
ST. THOMAS L.J. 5 (2004). 
 70. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 137; Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of 
Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2144 
n.7 (2005) (remarking that “it is, of course, possible that courts will be so hostile to same-sex 
couples that they will refuse to recognize same-sex marriage under any circumstances.”); cf. 
George, supra note 45, at 34 (expressing concern that the theories of activists promoting same-sex 
marriage will be accepted on a political basis by “socially liberal federal judges”). 
 71. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that the state constitution compelled 
the legislature to enact a legal regime equivalent to that of traditional marriage or same-sex 
marriage).  Ultimately the legislature decided to enact civil unions with full marital benefits.  VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201–1207 (2009). 
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same-sex marriage in Massachusetts,72 it is clear that most judges—even those 
in state high courts with authority to do otherwise—do not express an intension 
to craft new choice of law principles for questions pertaining to same-sex 
marriage and civil unions.  Instead, virtually all the decisions evince a desire to 
apply existing conflict of laws precedent73—typically referred to by those 
courts as “principles of comity.”74 
Therefore, much of the scholarship is not directly responsive to the 
situation in which judges find themselves—either because the works analyze 
the issues at a very high level generality,75 or because they weave descriptive 
analysis together with normative prescription.76  The goal of what follows is to 
make a modest contribution to the literature by describing the appropriate 
contours and applications of choice of law principles that follow from 
precedent, in a sampling of states that typify the major choice of law 
methodologies followed today in the states.77 
 
 72. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969–70 (Mass. 2003) (requiring, 
together with Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004), that the state 
start issuing same-sex marriages). 
 73. For a non-exhaustive list of cases engaging choice of law (comity) principles see, for 
example, Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 971 (Vt. 2006) (applying Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 287 (1971) and Vermont’s center of gravity choice of law 
precedent); B.S. v. F.B., 883 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009); Martinez v. Monroe, 850 
N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); Hennefeld v. Township, 22 N.J. Tax 166 (N.J. Tax Ct. 
2005); Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007) (Suttell, J., dissenting); In re Kandu, 315 
B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wa. 2004).  In other controversies such as in Rosengarden v. Downes, 802 
A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002), and Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002), 
common law conflicts principles were heavily briefed, but the court did not have occasion to 
reach that analysis because of, respectively, a lack of jurisdiction and an express state DOMA. 
 74. JOSEPH H. BEALE, 1 A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 53 (1935) (“[Comity] is 
employed merely as the title of the subject commonly called the Conflict of Laws; so that the 
phrase, a ‘foreign right is recognized by comity,’ means simply that by the Conflict of Laws 
recognition is given to it.”); see also infra note 114 (discussing the multiple meanings of comity). 
 75. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 35, at 2206 (noting, without elaboration, that “[a] second 
state to which [a] couple moves . . . under its own law . . . can, after measuring its interest as 
compared to that of the other state, determine whether it is willing to confer the particular 
benefit.”); KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at xv, 94 (contending that “ordinary choice of law 
analysis should continue to govern” incidents of marriage, but warning that he is “not predicting 
what courts will do in these cases”); Singer, supra note 17, at 24 (implying the possibility of 
forum non-recognition under the “incidental question” doctrine). 
 76. Silberman, supra note 35, at 2197 (“offer[ing] a normative analysis for [same-sex] 
conflict-of-laws issues . . . .”); Barbara Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry 
in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Get Home?, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1033, 1080 (1994) 
(alerting advocates for same-sex recognition that “it could be possible, but potentially dangerous, 
to argue that a court should consider . . . [its] prior choice-of-law decisions . . . .”).  But see 
KOPPELMAN, supra note 17. 
 77. Part III and IV infra analyze: (1) Rhode Island as a representative of a traditional (lex 
loci) jurisdiction, (2) New York and Pennsylvania (with additional cases from Texas, Montana, 
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II.  DISPLACING JUDICIAL CHOICE OF LAW & THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION 
As noted above, states have enacted, by legislation and popular 
referendum, a multiplicity of constitutional amendments and statutes—
commonly referred to as state DOMAs—on the subject of same-sex marriages 
and unions.78  To a degree, probably unbeknownst to many of the voters (and 
perhaps some legislators) who enacted these sources of positive law, the 
particular language chosen will determine whether a state DOMA merely has 
domestic effect, or whether it constitutes a “choice of law rule” that displaces 
judicial common law for the purpose of interstate recognition.  The canonical 
1878 case of Milliken v. Pratt is relevant here because it sets forth the bedrock 
principle that animates the existence of choice of law.  Milliken explains that 
conduct that is: 
[E]xpressly prohibited by the statutes of the state in which [a] suit is 
brought . . . is not necessarily nor usually deemed so invalid . . . [such that] its 
courts will refuse to entertain an action on [it, if the conduct occurred] abroad 
in a state the laws of which permit it.79 
Whether a state will “entertain such an action”—in other words, follow the 
foreign substantive law—depends entirely on the jurisdiction’s choice of law 
rule.  Thus, the forum’s substantive law does not govern unless that forum’s 
choice of law rules point towards forum law. 
The conceptual challenge for interpreting state DOMAs is that some were 
undoubtedly enacted only to alter (or reaffirm) the status of marriage and 
unions under domestic law,80 while others were aimed at codifying a non-
 
and Illinois) are examined as modern followers of a hybrid approach that includes evaluating rival 
“governmental interests” and measuring “significant contacts,” or “grouping of contacts” with the 
jurisdictions, and (3) Vermont as a state that principally uses a “significant contracts analysis,” 
also known as a “center of gravity” choice of law rule.  This article does not consider the 
Restatement (Second)—standing alone—as an approach, because “[s]ome states use the 
Restatement as a camouflage for a ‘grouping of contacts approach,’” while others use the 
Restatement’s banner to implement their hybrid modern approach (i.e., PA, NY), and finally 
others use only the Restatement’s most “general, open-ended and flexible sections of the 
Restatement (such as §§ 145, 187, and especially § 6) . . . .”  SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, 
at 299–300. 
 78. Domawatch.org, a program of the Alliance Defense Fund, maintains an online database 
of most of the state level developments.  See also KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 137–46 (setting 
forth Koppelman’s interpretation of the legal consequence of most State DOMAs). 
 79. Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878); see also SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 
3 (“With minor exceptions in its formative period, [conflict of law] adopted the premise that, in 
appropriate cases, the courts of one sovereign should be prepared to apply the law of another 
sovereign.”). 
 80. See, e.g., KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 138–39 (observing that some DOMAs were 
enacted in response to “[a]n application for a marriage license by same-sex couples, who [argued] 
that there was nothing in the statutes restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples”); cf. Hernandez 
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recognition choice of law rule for same-sex relationships officiated out-of-
state.81  It is beyond the scope of this article to scrutinize the text and 
enactment history of each state DOMA, but three general characterizations 
about how the judicial choice of law rules are affected are warranted. 
First, states such as Louisiana and Texas have explicitly adopted non-
recognition choice of law rules for the validity and incidents of all foreign 
same-sex relationships.82  Louisiana courts, consistent with the state’s civil law 
tradition, follow a choice of law rule for marriage and all other statuses found 
in the civil code.83  It provides, under the heading “Conflict of Laws—
Marriage,” that “[t]he status of a natural person and the incidents and effects of 
that status are governed by the law of the state whose policies would be most 
seriously impaired if its law were not applied to the particular issue.”84 
Yet, the state has a different choice of law rule for same-sex marriages and 
unions celebrated abroad; the code contains a non-recognition rule for foreign 
“purported marriage[s] between persons of the same sex.”85  This principle is 
explicitly reinforced in the Louisiana Constitution which states, “[a] legal 
status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried 
individuals shall not be valid or recognized.  No official or court of the state of 
Louisiana shall recognize any marriage contracted in any other jurisdiction 
which is not the union of one man and one woman.”86 
Texas similarly accomplishes total non-recognition by virtue of a statutory 
rule.  The statute reads: 
The state or an agency or political subdivision of the state may not give effect 
to a . . . right or claim to any legal protection, benefit, or responsibility asserted 
as a result of a marriage between persons of the same sex or a civil union in 
this state or in any other jurisdiction.87 
In states such as these—with language that makes specific reference to foreign 
marriages—any prior statutory or common law choice of law principle is 
 
v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5–6 (N.Y. 2006) (finding the suggestion that some amici had made, that 
New York’s statute could be “read to permit same-sex marriage, . . . untenable”). 
 81. See infra Part III.  For reasons that are explained in Part III, this article does not adopt 
Koppelman’s per se (categorical) distinction between evasive and migratory marriages.  As 
discussed in Part III, how a state handles lawsuits for incidents in both these scenarios will depend 
on the facts of the case and the particular contours of that state’s modern choice of law rule. 
 82. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3519 (2010); Tex. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204 (West 2009). 
 83. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3519 (2010). 
 84. Id.  Were Louisiana not a follower of the Napoleonic Code this provision would be 
found in judicial common law precedent rather than Article 3519 of the Civil Code. 
 85. Id. 
 86. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15. 
 87. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204 (West 2009). 
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clearly displaced.88  Additionally, state DOMAs that declare certain foreign 
same-sex relationships “void” or “prohibited” often should be given the same 
effect as DOMAs that explicitly reference choice of law or other state’s unions 
and marriages.89 
Second, some states such as Georgia aim to achieve foreign non-
recognition through the invocation of “public policy.”90  It is well established 
that though public policy “is not measured by individual notions of expediency 
and fairness,” it “is found in the State’s Constitution [and] statutes . . . .”91  It 
has come to be defined as situations in which applying foreign law “would 
violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of 
good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.”92  A new law 
 
 88. See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-112 (2010) (“Marriages valid by the laws of the 
place where contracted are valid . . . except marriages that are void and prohibited by § 25-101.”).  
“Marriage between persons of the same sex is void and prohibited.”  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
25-101 (2010).  New Hampshire, on the other hand, recognizes same sex marriages.  See N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1– 457:3 (2010). 
 89. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212 (2006) (“The following marriages are 
prohibited . . . a marriage between 2 individuals of the same sex.”).  However, courts should 
scrutinize the enactment history of these DOMAs carefully to distinguish those addressed to 
foreign same-sex relationships, and those solely concerned with establishing a domestic 
prohibition on same-sex unions and marriages.  This parsing is necessary because sometimes 
domestic statutes have “literal catholicity,” which “if taken at face value” would transform them 
into choice of law rules.  SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 551; cf. In re May’s Estate, 114 
N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y. 1953) (“Although the New York statute . . . declares to be incestuous and void 
a marriage between an uncle and a niece . . . it is important to note that the statute does not by 
express terms regulate a marriage solemnized in another state, where . . . the marriage was . . . 
legal.”).  May’s was a traditional approach case that undertook that analysis to determine if the 
legislature had displaced the “place of celebration rule” (i.e., dubbed, in the case, as the “positive 
law exception”).  See infra notes 288–295 and accompanying text (discussing May’s relevance to 
same-sex incidents). 
 90. Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-
3.1 (2010)). 
 91. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 688 (N.Y. 1985); see also Cooney 
v. Osgood Machinery, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 284 (N.Y. 1993) (“[P]ublic policy may be found in 
the State Constitution, statutes and judicial decisions . . . .”). 
 92. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918).  This use of public policy 
not to enforce foreign laws on the grounds that their substance is repugnant or “odious” has been 
criticized by Professor Koppelman in the interstate context on the grounds that “no [U.S.] state 
can have a legitimate interest in deliberately subverting the operation of laws of other states.”  
KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 26.  Koppelman would, however, sanction a state’s non-
recognition of certain repugnant laws from other nations.  He argues that a public policy 
exception to the laws of a Nazi regime, or the “racial laws of [apartheid] South Africa, the 
religious laws of Iran[, or] the sexually discriminatory laws of Saudi Arabia” would be justifiable.  
Id. at 23–24.  This author appreciates no principled distinction between those public policy 
exceptions and a state’s deep-rooted desire not to legitimize same-sex marriage, except in degree, 
and thus does not share Koppelman’s view.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that “preserving the traditional institution of marriage” is a 
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or constitutional amendment pertaining to public policy should in all situations 
successfully displace the working of the common law rule in a traditional 
Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws (1931) jurisdiction.  Those 
jurisdictions use lex loci celebrationis not just for marital validity but also for 
incidents.93  To illustrate, Georgia, unlike the majority of states with which this 
article is principally concerned,94 follows this Restatement (First) approach.95  
Accordingly, the Georgia Supreme Court had no trouble, in Burns v. Burns, 
concluding that “even if Vermont had purported to legalize same-sex 
marriages, [they] would not be recognized in Georgia” by virtue of its statutory 
DOMA  that declares it to be “the public policy of Georgia to recognize the 
union only of man and woman.”96 
In a modern choice of law state, whether a public policy will prompt non-
recognition of incidents will depend on whether the forum’s common law 
choice of law rule retains the public policy exception.  In a jurisdiction such 
as New York, a public policy DOMA—were it ever to be passed—would 
function to invalidate foreign same-sex marriages.97  In Cooney v. Osgood 
Machinery, New York’s highest court—the Court of Appeals—concluded that 
even under its “modern choice of law doctrine, [there can be] resort to the 
public policy exception . . . .”98  Conversely, in Montana—another modern 
choice of law jurisdiction—the state supreme court has held that the state does 
not “recognize a ‘public policy’ exception that would require application of 
Montana law even where Montana’s choice of law rules dictate application of 
the laws of another state . . . .”99 
 
“legitimate state interest” so long as it goes “beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded 
group”); cf. Barnes v. Glen Theatres, 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining 
that “society prohibits . . . certain activities . . . because they are considered, in the traditional 
phrase, ‘contra bonos mores,’ i.e., immoral.”). 
 93. It is an open question whether it is appropriate for a court to invalidate a union or an 
incident on the grounds of a public policy exception in the absence of a statutory or constitutional 
DOMA.  For the argument that it is appropriate see generally, Brief of Amicus Curiae Governor 
Donald L. Carcieri, Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (2007) (No. 06-340-M.P.).  For the 
counterargument see KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 20–27. 
 94. See infra Part III.B. 
 95. Griggs v. Harris, No. C79-2219, 1981 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18366 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 12, 1981). 
 96. 560 S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2010)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 97. As discussed supra note 14, New York presently celebrates same-sex marriages within 
the state. 
 98. 612 N.E.2d 277, 285 (N.Y. 1993).  As a formal matter, “the public policy exception 
should be considered only after the court has first determined, under choice of law principles, that 
the applicable substantive law is not the forum’s law.”  Id. at 284 (emphasis added). 
 99. Phillips v. General Motors Corp., 995 P.2d 1002, 1015 (Mont. 2000) (“Considerations of 
public policy are expressly subsumed within the most significant relationship approach” of the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law); see also BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 66, at 
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Third, state DOMAs that merely proscribe the issuance of domestic same-
sex marriages do not constitute a choice of law rule and thus the existing 
common law judicial doctrines should remain intact.100  This is also the case 
with respect to same-sex unions for the approximately twenty states without a 
stated choice of law rule or public policy towards these relationships.  All 
states in this category are in the conflict of laws situation described by 
Milliken—the conduct is proscribed domestically but permitted abroad.101  
Politically, these DOMAs (if statutory in nature) likely were passed to preempt 
state courts from using statutory interpretation to compel celebration by the 
forum of marriages or unions in order to reverse or preclude the state supreme 
court from “mandating recognition of same-sex  relationships.”102  The best 
known example of the latter was the constitutional reversal of Baehr v. Lewin 
“[i]n 1998 [by] the people of Hawaii [affirming] the heterosexual character of 
marriage.”103 
III.  PRECEDENTIAL & THEORETICAL SUPPORTS FOR ANALYZING “INCIDENTS” 
UNDER MODERN CHOICE OF LAW PRINCIPLES 
A. Comity vs. “Comity of Nations” 
Hennefeld v. Township of Montclair, a 2005  decision  by  the  New  Jersey  
Tax  Court,  will  help  introduce  the appropriate  analysis by modern choice 
of law jurisdictions.104  Then, as now, New Jersey followed a modern approach 
to conflicts that “combin[es] [governmental] interest analysis with the 
 
326–27 (suggesting that Montana’s approach is more sensible assuming that the public policy 
exception may only be invoked by the state with the most substantial interest in the case). 
 100. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (2010) (a 1977 provision predating the interstate 
recognition controversy); WYO. STAT. ANN. §20-1-111 (2010) (the state follows its lex loci rule 
for tort and contract for marriage’s validity); WASH. REV. CODE. § 26.04.010 (2011) (“Marriage 
is a civil contract between a male and a female”); OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a (“It is the policy of 
Oregon, and its subdivisions, that only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid 
or legally recognized as a marriage.”) (emphasis added).  The conclusion that Oregon’s 
Constitutional Amendment is purely domestic (as opposed to a choice of law rule declaring 
foreign marriages void) is based on two considerations: first, the court’s discussion of the 
Amendment in Li v. Oregon, 110 P.3d 91 (Or. 2005) (en banc), and second, on the fact that the 
constitutional provision was passed in response to local counties officiating same-sex weddings 
based on their interpretations of state statutes. 
 101. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 102. KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 139. 
 103. George, supra note 45, at 32; HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-3 (2010) (Hawaii’s DOMA, 
though superseding Baehr’s constitutional interpretation, is silent on the issue of out-of-state 
same-sex recognition for either unions or marriages). 
 104. 22 N.J. Tax 166 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2005).  The particular holding of the case is now moot in 
New Jersey because of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 
196, 220 (N.J. 2006), requiring civil unions with full marital benefits as a matter of equal 
protection under the State Constitution. 
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Restatement  (Second).”105  The plaintiffs in Hennefeld were two gay men who 
had married in Canada.106  They sought to be recognized “as spouses” for the 
purpose of filing their New Jersey State tax return.107  In analyzing whether to 
recognize the international marriage, the tax court relied on the Supreme Court 
precedent of Hilton v. Guyot108 that pertains to “comity of nations.”109  In 
denying the plaintiff’s claim, the tax court relied on a principle from Hilton 
that “as a general matter, the laws of one nation do not have force of effect 
beyond its borders.”110  Utilizing this rationale was deeply flawed and 
illustrates the need for judges to carefully discern “the meaning of the [word 
comity] in a particular case [precedent]” before relying on it.111  As renowned 
conflict of laws scholar Joseph Beale explained in 1935, “the word comity 
[can] be a very ambiguous term.”112  Comity is frequently a label for a state’s 
choice of law rule,113 yet in other contexts it can refer to any of several 
different principles pertaining to the extraterritorial application of another 
nation’s law.114 
 
 105. SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 300–01. 
 106. Hennefeld, 22 N.J. Tax at 172–73.  The men also had a Vermont civil union but the court 
held that New Jersey’s statute only pertained to marriages and thus this legal relationship was 
irrelevant.  Id. 
 107. Id. at 176–77.  Tracing its lineage back to a remark by Justice Marshall in The Antelope, 
23 U.S. 66, 123 (1825), it has historically been the practice of American state courts to adhere to a 
policy of blanket non-recognition with respect to other states’ “penal laws.”  Robert A. Leflar, 
Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Government Claims, 46 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1932).  
Many courts—as the Supreme Court recently discussed in Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 
349, 369–70 (2005)—by extension, also decline all recognition of “foreign revenue laws.”  
BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 66, at 172.  Under a slight variation of the facts of 
Hennefeld, such that the plaintiff argued that a provision of his home state’s tax law should apply 
in the forum, this foreign “revenue law rule” might apply in lieu of ordinary choice of law rules.  
Koppelman poses a hypothetical in which “a person from Connecticut who is in a civil union 
there works in New York City.”  KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 111.  He concludes that the 
“[Connecticut civil-union] should be recognized for purposes of computing his or her [New York 
State] tax deductions.”  Id.  Because New York State ascribes to the revenue law non-recognition 
principle, City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 184 N.E.2d 167, 169 (N.Y. 1962), it might decline to 
give effect to the Connecticut deduction on this ground.  However, most of the foreign revenue 
law cases involve a foreign sovereign seeking to collect another state’s taxes or prosecute a 
foreign state tax evader, so whether to give effect to a foreign deduction may be beyond the reach 
of the rule and instead be subject to the ordinary choice of law analysis. 
 108. 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895). 
 109. Hennefeld, 22 N.J. Tax at 178. 
 110. Id. 
 111. SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 19. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Even then, a court in a non-traditional jurisdiction must be certain that the case is from 
the modern conflicts era. 
 114. Comity may refer, as in Hilton v. Guyot, to process by which a U.S. court decides 
whether to recognize a foreign nation’s judgment.  SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 816–
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The tax court explained that it applied the Hilton standard because the 
federal bankruptcy case In re Kandu115 had done so in a factually analogous 
situation.116  In Kandu, two lesbian woman married in Canada claimed they 
were eligible to file jointly under a U.S. bankruptcy code provision affording 
spouses this privilege.117  Though Kandu was indeed quite similar, the tax 
court erred in relying on it because of the difference between it—a state court 
applying state choice of law  principles—and the U.S. bankruptcy court 
considering a conflict between a foreign nation’s law and federal law.  It is 
well-established that U.S. federal courts—mimicking the practice of most 
foreign countries—will not consider “displacing [their] otherwise applicable 
public law with that of [another] [n]ation.”118 
State courts, by contrast, have no such prohibition.  Instead, they apply the 
same choice of law methodologies whether confronted with a conflict with 
another U.S. state’s law, or another nation’s law.119  Simply put, precedent 
dictates that a state court adjudicating a case pertaining to recognition of a 
 
17.  The term comity can also refer to the interpretative cannon, the “presumption against 
extraterritoriality,” as deployed in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991), 
and discussed in Hartford Fire Insurance, Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“‘[P]rescriptive comity’ [is] the respect sovereign nations afford each other by 
limiting the reach of their laws.”).  BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 66, at 759.  
Additionally, international comity is a descriptor sometimes used for the so-called “Charming 
Betsy” cannon that “an act of [C]ongress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations 
if any other possible construction remains.”  SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 552. 
 115. In Re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 133 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004).  In re Kandu concluded that 
“[b]ecause the British Columbia policy and the United States policy concerning marriage directly 
conflict, this Court must prefer its own laws finding DOMA controlling in this case.”  Id. at 133–
34. 
 116. Hennefeld v. Twp. of Montclair, 22 N.J. Tax 166, 178 (2005). 
 117. Id. at 180 (noting that the federal Defense of Marriage Act made clear that U.S. law did 
not consider same-sex marriages to be married). 
 118. Phillip McConnaughay, Reviving the “Public Law Taboo” in International Conflict of 
Laws, 35 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 255, 256 (1999) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW §§ 401–03 (1987)) (“[U]rg[ing] the extension of . . . interest balancing principles 
to public law generally.”); see also, BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 66, at 742–43 
(describing this phenomenon but raising questions about its justifications). 
 119. It should be observed that a federal court effectively takes the posture of a state court 
when it sits in diversity jurisdiction.  See generally, BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 66, at 
565–625 (discussing the implications of Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny).  
On such an occasion pursuant to Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), 
the federal forum will adopt the conflict of law rule of the state court in whose jurisdiction the 
court sits.  BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 66, at 578.  Consequently, a federal court in 
diversity will have the same approach to conflicts with the law of another nation as that of state 
courts.  A secondary error with the court’s reliance on Hilton is that the case, post-Erie, at most, 
“enunciates a rule of federal common law . . . not binding on the states.”  SYMEONIDES ET AL., 
supra note 9, at 820. 
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same-sex Canadian marriage should analyze it identically as a same-sex 
Massachusetts marriage or Vermont civil union.120 
A final observation about comity is necessary before proceeding to analyze 
the state case law on heterosexual marriage.  As the New York Court of 
Appeals opined in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. (1918), “the misleading word 
‘comity’ has been responsible for much of the trouble.”121  This term: 
[H]as been fertile in suggesting a discretion unregulated by general principles.  
The sovereign in its discretion may refuse its aid to the foreign right.  From 
this it has been an easy step to the conclusion that a like freedom of choice has 
been confided to the courts.  But that, of course, is a false view.122 
The Loucks court did not mean that choice of law was not a field of judge 
made common law, but instead it sought to convey that the decision to apply a 
foreign jurisdiction’s law, in any particular case, was not commended to “the 
pleasure of the judges, to suit [their] independent notion[s] of expediency or 
fairness.”123  In considering whether to apply a Massachusetts wrongful death 
statute to an accident that had occurred in Massachusetts, the Loucks court 
reasoned that it must consider “death statutes in their relation to the general 
body of private international law124 . . . and apply the same rules applicable to 
other torts . . . .”125  Noting that the prevailing choice of law rule of the day 
 
 120. See, e.g., Beth R. v. Donna M, 853 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (applying New 
York choice of law—albeit inappropriately because it relied on case law that pre-dated the 
conflict’s revolution—to the issue of recognition of a Canadian same-sex marriage for the incident 
of divorce); C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S. 2d 884 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (similarly analyzing a claim 
for divorce on the basis of a Massachusetts same-sex marriage); see also, SYMEONIDES ET AL., 
supra note 9, at 537 (explaining that in state cases such as Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473 
(1963), “the foreign [country] dimension of the conflict did not have a bearing on either the 
outcome or the choice-of-law methodology utilized[.]”).  See also infra note 174 and 
accompanying text. 
 121. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (1918); cf. BEALE, supra note 74, 
at 53 (explaining “that the phrase, a ‘foreign right is recognized by comity,’ means simply that by 
the Conflict of Laws recognition is given to it.”). 
 122. Loucks, 120 N.E. at 202 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  More recently Rhode 
Island’s Attorney General described comity “not [as] a rule of law, but rather, a courtesy or 
practicality based on a regard for the law of a foreign state.”  Letter from Patrick Lynch, R.I. 
Att’y Gen., to Jack R. Warner, Comm’r of R.I. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ. (Feb. 20, 
2007), available at http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/advocacy/RIAttorneyGeneral_State 
ment.pdf.  Though his analysis goes on, properly, to follow the state’s choice of law precedent, 
this quote provides a contemporary example of how “comity” can be a siren’s song—imperiling 
incautious scholars or judges. 
 123. Loucks, 120 N.E. at 202. 
 124. Private International Law is the original term for conflict of law or choice of law.  It 
continues to this day to be used in European jurisprudence.  Arthur Taylor von Mehren, 
Comment, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and Significance in 
Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REV. 350, 351, 355–56 (1974). 
 125. Loucks, 120 N.E. at 202. 
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was that “[a] tort committed in one state creates a right of action that may be 
sued upon in another,”126 the court appropriately applied Massachusetts law.127  
That was New York’s common law as of 1918.  As courts confront similar 
conflict of law problems today,128 what general principle of “private 
international law” should guide them?  It is to that inquiry we now turn. 
B. Modern ‘Heterosexual Marriage’ Jurisprudence as Authority for 
Resolving Today’s Same-Sex Litigation 
This article follows the usual convention of using the term traditional to 
refer to the choice of law methodology codified in 1934 by Joseph Beale when 
he drafted the Restatement (First) of the Law, Conflict of Laws for the 
American Law Institute.129  The traditional system was based on the idea of 
territorialism coupled with “vested rights.”130  In general, the law of a state 
prevails throughout that state’s boundaries;131 but “[a] right having been 
created by the appropriate law, the recognition of its existence should follow 
everywhere.  Thus an act valid where done [could not] be called in question 
anywhere.”132  In the substantive areas of tort and contract, the basic rules—lex 
loci delicti and lex loci contractus, respectively—governed.  For the most part, 
a contract’s validity was guided by the location of the contract’s formation; in 
tort law, the forum adopted “the law of the place of the wrong.”133  For 
marriage, the concept was similar.  The lex celebrationis rule provided that: “a 
marriage [was] valid everywhere if the requirements of the marriage law of the 
state where the contract of marriage [took] place [had been] complied with.”134  
 
 126. Id. at 200. 
 127. Id. at 202. 
 128. See, e.g., Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. of N.Y., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2005) (noting a same-sex individual sought New York recognition of the right Vermont had 
conferred upon him to recover for wrongful death by virtue of his Vermont civil-union with the 
decedent).  Part III infra analyzes this case in detail. 
 129. SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 13; ALI Overview: Creation, THE AMERICAN 
LAW INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.creation (last visited Aug. 12, 
2011) (explaining that the ALI was founded in 1923 by a group of legal professionals including 
Supreme Court “Chief Justice and former President William Howard Taft, future Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes, and former Secretary of State Elihu Root” to help resolve uncertainties in 
“principles of the common law”). 
 130. SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 19. 
 131. Id. 
 132. JOSEPH H. BEALE, 3 A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1969 (1935). 
 133. See SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 35 (describing that “the law of the place of 
[contractual] performance (lex loci solutionis) determin[ed] . . . the manner, time, place, and 
sufficiency of performance [as well as] permissible excuses for non-performance.”); id. at 20–23 
(noting various approaches were adopted to “identify” the place of the tort). 
 134. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 121 (1934); see, e.g., True v. Ranney, 
21 N.H. 52, 52 (N.H. 1850) (“[T]he validity of a contract of marriage depends on the lex loci 
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Additionally, as has been widely acknowledged elsewhere, a policy notion that 
there was a unique “desirability [to] uniformity [on] the question [of] the 
validity of a marriage”—so that cohabitants and their offspring could be sure 
of their status when they traveled and relocated—also motivated the traditional 
rule.135 
Though protecting the couple’s expectation was a motivation behind the 
traditional rule, it would be inaccurate to conclude that this rationale dictated 
the outcomes.  In Farah v. Farah, Virginia—a traditional choice of law state to 
this day136—refused to recognize a marriage performed in Pakistan on the 
grounds that, just as “[a] marriage that is valid under the law of the state or 
country where it is celebrated is valid in Virginia, . . . [a] marriage that is void 
where it was celebrated is void everywhere.”137  The marriage had been 
performed according to Islamic practice, which included the signing of a 
religious marriage contract, a promise to pay a dower, and the designation of 
proxies who had gone to England and performed the necessary religious rituals 
on the couple’s behalf.138  Finally, when the so-called proxy marriage was 
complete, the couple had a reception with their family in Pakistan.139  After 
those steps, it is difficult to imagine that the couple did not believe themselves 
to be husband and wife.  And yet, the court concluded that because under 
Pakistani law (the place of celebration) the woman was ineligible to marry—by 
virtue of her membership in “a controversial Muslim sect”—Virginia would 
not recognize the marriage for the purpose of divorcing the couple and 
dividing their assets, now in America.140 
Also, likewise under lex celebrationis, a forum court could decline to 
recognize a marriage when one or both of the spouses temporarily traveled to 
another state in order to evade a domestic law that would bar their marriage.  
The Restatement (First) Section 132 accomplishes this by providing that “a 
marriage which is against the law of the domcil [sic] of either party, though the 
requirements of the place of the celebration have been complied with, will be 
invalid.”141  One commentator explained Section 132 as “recogniz[ing] in the 
 
contractus.”); cf. Black v. Powers, 628 S.E.2d 546, 554–55 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (applying the law 
of the Virgin Islands, where a prenuptial contract was drawn up, rather than Virginia law—the 
forum in which relief was sought). 
 135. 52 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 932 (2d ed. 1970).  However, that argument was 
developed in the context of a relatively polar dichotomy.  The alternative—before modern 
theories pertaining to ‘interests’ and ‘contacts’ developed—was that the law of the forum would 
govern and a marriage could be extinguished for all purposes. 
 136. SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 301–02. 
 137. 429 S.E.2d 626, 629 (Va. Ct. App. 1993). 
 138. Id. at 627. 
 139. Id. at 627–28. 
 140. Id. at 629. 
 141. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 132 (1934). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] THE MISSING INGREDIENT 351 
domicile an absolute power, exercisable by statute or otherwise, to control for 
any reason the validity of its people’s marriages celebrated anywhere.”142  In 
Wilkins v. Zelichowski, a New Jersey couple traveled to Indiana to obtain a 
marriage that they could not have secured in their home state because they 
were both under the age of majority.143  The woman then sought an annulment 
under a provision of New Jersey law directed at New Jersey marriages.  The 
lower courts had denied relief “on the ground that the marriage was valid in 
Indiana and should therefore, under principles of the conflict of laws, not be 
nullified by a New Jersey court . . . .”144  In explaining its reversal, the 
Supreme Court stated that: 
The marriage status both in its creation and destruction is of great importance 
not only to the individual, but also to the state where he makes his home.  And 
while the law of the place where the ceremony is performed has an interest in 
the validity of the ceremony, it has none in the intrinsic validity of the status, 
unless the status is to be enjoyed there.145 
Wilkins and Farah are instructive because they demonstrate that even 
under the vested rights regime of the Restatement (First), forum states had 
several doctrinal opportunities to assert their own policies—any contrary 
expectations of the couple or contrary interest of the celebration state 
notwithstanding.  Nonetheless, the place of celebration rule did have 
considerable effect in the mine-run of cases.  It meant that couples domiciled 
in a foreign state could freely migrate from the place of marital celebration to 
other states and have their unions recognized for essentially all purposes.  
When the marriage violated a deep-seated public policy, the forum state could 
deny recognition.146  For example, in State v. Ross, North Carolina did not 
 
 142. Perry Dane, Whereof One Cannot Speak: Legal Diversity and the Limits of a Restatement 
of Conflict of Laws, 75 IND. L.J. 511, 513 (2000).  “The traditional common law rule, embodied in 
the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) was that the validity of a marriage is governed 
by the law of the place where it is celebrated unless it violates the public policy . . . of the parties’ 
domicile at the time of the marriage . . . .”  Singer, supra note 17, at 14.  This “public policy” did 
not have to be a strong public policy or abhorrence; instead a mere prohibition domestically by the 
laws of the domicile of either spouse would suffice.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 illus. 2 (1934) (stating that if A (domiciled in State Y) and B 
(domiciled in State Z) marry in neutral State X that permits their union, but State Z would have 
prohibited the marriage in its territory then “the marriage is invalid and will be so held when its 
validity comes into question in X, Y, Z, or a fourth state.” (emphasis added)). 
 143. 140 A.2d 65, 65 (N.J. 1958). 
 144. Id. at 66. 
 145. Id. at 68 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 146. In what is generally thought to be the canonical statement of the scope of the public 
policy exception the New York Court of Appeals in Loucks stated: “We are not so provincial as to 
say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home.  . . . 
[Courts] do not close their doors, unless help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, 
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invoke public policy regarding an incident stemming from an interracial 
marriage—the inheritance of spousal property—despite labeling the union 
“revolting to us and to all persons.”147  The Ross Court explained that it 
perceived “[t]he most prominent if not the only known [public policy] 
exceptions to [lex celebrationis as] those marriages involving polygamy and 
incest,” and declined to agree with the state Attorney General that “a marriage 
between persons of different races [was] as unnatural and as revolting as an 
incestuous one . . . .”148 
Prominent conflict of laws scholar Andrew Koppelman has advanced the 
argument that the most a forum can do justifiably, in the direction of non-
recognition, is “draw[] the line” as the Ross Court did.  In other words, he 
posits that if a marriage does not qualify as an evasion case,149 then the law of 
the place of celebration must govern its validity and incidents such as 
inheritance.150  He marshals a number of “miscegenation” precedents (which 
he divides into three groups) in support of this argument.  For the first group, 
the so-called “evasion” cases, he concedes that they embody a majority 
approach—non-recognition—in the same vein as Wilkins considered above.151  
The second group consists of cases in which the interracial couple never 
cohabited in the forum state.  These cases are said to be clear candidates for 
recognition.152  The third group consists of “migratory” interracial marriages.  
According to the place of celebration rule, he concludes that if the marriage 
was celebrated either (1) by domiciliaries of the state of celebration, or (2) 
former domiciliaries of the forum who at the time of marriage had no intention 
to return,153 then the couple “should be able to move anywhere and take the 
marriage with them.”154  He then notes how the Southern courts “were split 
about the status of migratory marriages, though they tended to recognize 
them.”155  The split though was over the scope and dimension of the public 
policy exception.156 
 
some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.”  
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 201–02 (N.Y. 1918). 
 147. 76 N.C. 242, 246 (N.C. 1877). 
 148. Id. at 245–46. 
 149. KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 43. 
 150. See supra note 142 (discussing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132). 
 151. KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 37–39. 
 152. Id. at 39–42. 
 153. Id. at 42–47. 
 154. Id. at 42–43; Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 454 (1973) (“[T]he domicile of an 
individual is his true, fixed and permanent home and place of habitation. It is the place to which, 
whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.”) (citation omitted). 
 155. KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 49. 
 156. Id. at 48–49. 
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The so-called majority approach (recognition) is thought to be typified by 
cases such as Ross and Bonds v. Foster.157  Ross concerned a black woman 
who, originally a North Carolina resident, reestablished domicile in South 
Carolina so that she could legally marry a white man.  After the marriage and 
the elapse of time, the couple moved to North Carolina, and when the husband 
later died, the court upheld the marriage for the purpose of the wife’s ability to 
inherit from him.158  Foster involved a white man and slave woman who 
cohabitated in Ohio and met the requirements for a common law marriage.159  
The couple later moved to Texas which, unlike Ohio, had a law prohibiting 
interracial marriage.160  The court held that it would recognize the marriage for 
the purpose of immunizing the wife’s property from liquidation to pay off 
creditors. 
Conversely, the minority approach (non-recognition) Koppelman posits is 
embodied by State v. Bell.161  That case involved an interracial couple from 
Mississippi who married there legally but later migrated to Tennessee.  The 
husband was successfully prosecuted for fornication, and the courts refused to 
recognize the Mississippi marriage as a defense.  The court justified its 
decision by determining that miscegenation was most offended in the case of 
migratory cohabitation.  Generally speaking, the Southern courts were less 
willing to deviate from the law of the place of the celebration for incidents than 
for laws that proscribed cohabitation in their boundaries.162  This insight may 
be instructive for modern courts trying to judicially determine how deeply held 
a policy exception must be to justify non-recognition.163  However, as noted 
 
 157. Id. at 44. 
 158. Id. at 28–29; see generally State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242, 143 (N.C. 1877). 
 159. Bonds v. Foster, 36 Tex. 68, 70 (Tex. 1871). 
 160. KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 44–45.  The case does not fall within Section 132 
(“evasion”) because, although the wife had once been a North Carolina domiciliary, she 
established a bona fide new domicile in South Carolina (which permitted interracial marriage) 
“without an intent to return with [her husband]” to North Carolina.”  Ross, 76 N.C. at 143. 
 161. KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 46 (discussing State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9, 10–11 (Tenn. 
1872)). 
 162. Cf. Henson, supra note 35, at 564 (1994) (suggesting that a “public policy against 
polygamous cohabitation, had that been a factor, would have been held to be strong enough to 
invalidate the marriage.”). 
 163. KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 49.  Of course the comparison is ethically and legally 
problematic because miscegenation laws served no rational purpose, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 11 (1967), while limits on same-sex marriage have been substantiated under rational basis 
review by federal and state courts.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (M.D. 
Fla. 2005); Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 879 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Hernandez v. 
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10 (N.Y. 2006); In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 677–78 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2010).  For a moral critique not borne of animus, see George & Bradley, supra 
note 68; Finnis, supra note 68. 
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above,164 and as explained below, the analytical framework used in 
miscegenation cases and other traditional jurisdictions applying lex 
celebrationis constitutes a pre-modern approach that is analytically distinct 
from “the Restatement (Second) rule.”165 
The traditional approach originally “had an almost universal following in 
the United States,” but over time courts began to express dissatisfaction with, 
and practice “evasion from[,] the . . . system of the first Restatement.”166  New 
York was the first state to experiment with explicit departures from the First 
Restatement.167  With Auten v. Auten (1954), the New York Court of Appeals 
rejected lex loci contractus and applied the rule that the law “of the place with 
the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute” should govern.168  
Instead of applying the law of the place where the parties had drawn up a 
marital separation agreement—New York—the court applied English law 
because England continued to be the domicile of the wife and her children 
from the marriage.169 In Haag v. Barnes (1961), the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the Auten approach and determined that the law of the “center of gravity”—not 
the law where contracted— should govern the interpretation of a child support 
agreement.170 
Unlike some states such as Vermont, which concluded that a “grouping of 
contacts”171—as in Barnes and Auten—should be their definitive modern 
rule,172 New York “evolved” further and incorporated parts of a theory known 
as “governmental interest analysis.”173  As first conceived by Brainerd Currie, 
this theory dictated that each court was to assess its state’s policy interest (i.e. 
 
 164. Supra notes 17–29 and accompanying text. 
 165. But see KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 42–43; Henson, supra note 35, at 560–61 
(explaining the Restatement (Second) as a place of the celebration rule with a public policy 
exception). 
 166. SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 113. 
 167. Id. at 117.  This process was heavily influenced by Professor Walter Wheeler Cook with 
a series of essays in the 1920s and a seminal critique of the traditional approach published in 
1942— “The Logical and Legal Bases of Conflict of Laws.”  BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra 
note 66, at 181. 
 168. Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (N.Y. 1954). 
 169. Id.; see also SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 117. 
 170. Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441, 443 (N.Y. 1961). 
 171. Id. at 444; Auten, 124 N.E.2d at 102. 
 172. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d at 443. 
 173. Myers v. Langlois, 721 A.2d 129, 130–31 (Vt. 1998) (Supreme Court of Vermont 
applying the Restatement (Second) in a manner that prioritizes “center of gravity” and “grouping 
of contacts”); see also SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 301–02 (observing the variation in 
modern approaches between Vermont [classic Restatement (Second) state] and New York [a so-
called hybrid modern state]). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] THE MISSING INGREDIENT 355 
an educated guess about legislative intent) in applying its law to the fact 
scenario presented in the case.174 
In an opinion that invoked a variety of academic writings on modern 
conflict of laws, the Court of Appeals in Babcock v. Jackson rejected lex loci 
delicti for torts.175  Noting that “[t]he traditional choice of law rule, embodied 
in the original Restatement of conflict of laws and until recently 
unquestioningly followed in this court,” the Court of Appeals held that this 
vested rights doctrine “ha[d] . . . been discredited [for] fail[ing] to take account 
of underlying policy considuerations [sic] in evaluating the significance to be 
ascribed to the circumstance that an act had a foreign situs . . . .”176  
Ultimately, New York synthesized the holding of Babcock on the one hand, 
and Auten and Barnes on the other, in what has been labeled a “Combined-
Modern” approach.177  In 1993, the Court of Appeals summarized the state’s 
modern choice of law jurisprudence in Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. (Stolarz).178  
The Stolarz Court stated, in “contract cases . . . involv[ing] only the private 
economic interests of the parties . . . [t]he ‘center of gravity’ or ‘grouping of 
contacts’ choice of law theory [is] applied . . . .”179  However, “[t]here are . . . 
instances where the policies underlying conflicting laws in a contract dispute 
are readily identifiable and reflect strong governmental interests, and therefore 
should be considered.”180  The court went on to apply both approaches to the 
question of what law should govern an automobile contract on the theory that 
“highly regulated as it is, [it] may implicate both the private economic interests 
of the parties and governmental interests in the enforcement of its regulatory 
scheme.”181 
This “revolution”182 in choice of law doctrine called for a different 
analysis for marital incidents.  As early as 1933, the Supreme Court had 
observed, in Yarborough v. Yarborough, that “[w]ithout denying the validity of 
a marriage in another state, the privileges flowing from marriage may be 
subject to the local law.”183  This principle was, in fact, recognized dating back 
 
 174. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1963); see also SYMEONIDES ET AL., 
supra note 9, at 127. 
 175. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 
80 HARV. L. REV. 377, 388 (1966). 
 176. Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 281 (emphasis added). 
 177. SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 302. 
 178. 613 N.E.2d 936, 938–39 (N.Y. 1993). 
 179. Id. at 939. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 113 (stating that the term revolution, while 
“hyperbolic,” is “a shorthand description for the American search for new ways of resolving 
conflicts problems.”). 
 183. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 218 n.10 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting) 
(citing—as support for this principle—the interracial marriage case discussed supra, State v. Bell, 
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to English common law.  In Somerset v. Stewart (Court of King’s Bench) 
(1772), Judge Lord Mansfield “adopt[ed] the relation” of slavery but “without 
adopting it in all its consequences.”184  Mansfield declined to grant the 
affirmative operation of English law to the detention of a slave, while noting 
that by contrast, a “[c]ontract for sale of a slave [was] good” in England.185  
Yet, as discussed above, under the traditional approach, the only “escape” for 
the forum from the strict “unthinking”—to quote from Babcock—deference to 
the place of the celebration was to invoke a strong countervailing public 
policy.186  This was a blunt instrument though, and courts applied it 
unpredictably.  As one scholar stated in 1956, “[t]he principal vice of the 
public policy concept[] is that it provides a substitute for analysis.  [It] stand[s] 
in the way of careful thought, of discriminating distinctions and, of true policy 
development in the conflict of law.”187  After jurisdictions adopted modern 
rules, they began to apply those new principles, innovated in tort and contract, 
to the incidents of marriage and of other statuses, such as paternity and 
adoption. 
In response to the conflict revolution, the American Law Institute began 
drafting the Restatement (Second) in 1953.188  Texas adopted a variant of the 
Restatement (Second)’s “most significant contacts” approach in 1984 with 
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.189  The Texas Supreme Court concluded that 
lex loci delicti and lex contractus “sacrifice[d] just and reasoned results for . . . 
mechanistic decision making.”190  In its place, the court held that the state 
would follow the “general principles stated in [Restatement (Second)] § 6191 
[that it concluded] produc[ed] reasoned choice of law decisions grounded in 
those specific governmental policies relevant to the particular substantive 
 
that had invoked a public policy exception to the traditional rule for marriage to prevent the 
cohabitation of an interracial couple). 
 184. (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (K.B.). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 187. Monrad Paulsen & Michael Sovern, “Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. 
L. REV. 969, 1016 (1956). 
 188. SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 141 (noting that its author, Professor Willis 
Reese, “was a member of the new school of conflicts though, although not of its revolutionary 
branch.”). 
 189. See generally Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (1984); see also 
SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 300 (explaining that states that make § 6 the centerpiece 
of their modern analysis (such as Texas) have much more “general, open-ended” choice of law 
jurisprudence than many of the other states that also invoke the Restatement (Second) for contact 
counting or hybrid approaches of contacts and governmental interest (as envisioned by Currie)). 
 190. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 421. 
 191. These principles include, inter alia, “(a) the needs of the interstate and international 
systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested 
states . . . [, and] (d) the protection of justified expectations.”  Id. at 420 n.5. 
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issue.”192  The very next year in Seth v. Seth, a Texas court stated that in light 
of Duncan and Guttierez (a case abandoning lex loci delicti) “Section 6 
criteria, and not the place of celebration test, should be applied to determine 
choice of law in a marriage or divorce context.”193  This application of modern 
rules to marital incidents was not unique to Texas; in fact, states throughout the 
nation dealt with a variety of status incidents in this manner.  This practice was 
not driven simply by the courts either—the new Restatement specifically called 
for a new approach to marriage. 
An element that stayed essentially the same was the principle that evasive 
marriages need not be recognized anywhere.  The original Restatement § 132 
dealt with this in terms of domicile, and the Restatement (Second) § 283 
explained that a marriage was invalid if it violated the public policy of the 
“state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the 
marriage at the time of the marriage.”194  In virtually all cases the new wording 
would not make a difference since the state of the parties’ domicile would 
typically be the state with the most significant relationship.195  The language 
about marital validity that had appeared in the original § 121 was repeated 
nearly verbatim: “a marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state 
where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized.”196  This 
fact may explain why most scholars have erroneously suggested that “[t]he 
conflicts revolution . . . bypassed choice of law rules on marriage.”197  
However, as a leading text on conflicts notes, “[t]he Restatement (Second) 
draws a distinction between questions of ‘pure’ status . . . on the one hand, and 
the ‘incidents’ or effects of such status on the other hand.”198 
[T]he Restatement’s rules on the status of marriage (§ 283) . . . clearly tilt 
toward the validity of marriage . . . and are based on the premise that a person’s 
status should not change by the mere movement from one state to another.  In 
contrast, the Restatement’s rules on the incidents of these statuses (§§ 284, 
288) do not contain such a tilt.  They are based on the premise that, while the 
 
 192. Id. at 421. 
 193. Seth v. Seth, 694 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. App. 1985).  In fact, the Seth court actually 
went further and declared that Restatement (Second) would apply to the validity of the marriage 
ceremony itself.  Id.  However, as discussed below in the text, the Restatement (Second) advises a 
separation of incidents and validity.  Courts in other jurisdictions such as New York, Vermont, 
and Pennsylvania hew more closely to the teachings of the Restatement on marriage, in their 
modern jurisprudence. 
 194. SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 429. 
 195. KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 17–20; Linda J. Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii 
Bind the World? A Comment on Same-Sex Marriage and Federalism Values, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. 
REV. 191, 194 (1996) (concluding same). 
 196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971). 
 197. Fruehwald, supra note 37, at 819; see KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 17 (implying the 
same). 
 198. SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 431. 
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status itself should not be altered by movement from one state to another, the 
incidents of status may well be affected by such a movement.199 
This distinction between status and incidents is one that modern choice of 
law courts take seriously.  In quoting introductory notes from the Restatements 
(Second) on Conflicts, a 1985 Washington State court remarked that: 
 In law, a status can be viewed from two standpoints.  It can be viewed as a 
relationship which continues as the parties move from state to state, or it can 
be viewed from the standpoint of incidents which arise from it. . . . 
 On occasion, the courts are faced with a question of pure status, namely 
whether, as a general proposition, there is a marital, or a legitimate, or an 
adoptive relationship between the parties . . . .  It is clear, however, that 
questions involving the incidents of a status arise more frequently . . . .200 
In keeping with this typology, an en banc Washington Supreme Court, in 
1997, applied its “most significant relationship” rules to the “marital incident” 
of how a deceased husband’s assets should be divided between his first wife 
and his third wife.201  The State of Texas had celebrated the union of the 
husband and the first wife, while the man had remarried in Washington without 
divorcing his first wife.202  Under the law of the celebration, the first wife had a 
claim to one-fourth of all his property, including a two-million dollar lottery 
award.203  Under Washington law, the third marriage de facto invalidated any 
prior marriages and the first wife thus inherited nothing.204  The court 
identified genuinely rival state interests in the application of Texas or 
Washington law.  Texas had a policy of “respecting the sanctity of the 
marriage relationship and ensuring the support of both spouses within that 
marriage.”205  Washington, contrastingly, provided that a wife should not 
benefit from community property rules when she and her husband had 
separated and been estranged such that “there is no ‘community.’”206  
Applying Restatement § 6 and the specific provision dealing with the 
 
 199. Id. (noting that “Section[] 284 . . . provide[s] that, when a marriage is valid under the law 
applicable to it under § 293, . . . the forum ‘usually’ gives the same incidents to such a status as 
the forum’s law provides.  The word ‘usually’ implies that the forum may choose not to accord 
certain of those incidents, or to accord certain incidents . . . .”).  It is also instructive to note that, 
according to Section 283, comment h, the drafters—in repeating the celebration rule for validity—
had in mind that the “differences among the marriage laws of various states usually involve only 
minor matters of debatable policy rather than fundamentals.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 cmt. h (1971). 
 200. In re Estate of Cook, 698 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985). 
 201. Seizer v. Sessions, 940 P.2d 261, 265 (Wash. 1997). 
 202. Id. at 263. 
 203. Id. at 266. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
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acquisition of movable marital property (§ 258), the court reasoned that 
Washington law, not the law of celebration, should apply.207  Other 
jurisprudence on which the court was briefed had held that “[t]he need to 
resolve conflicting claims to property situated in Washington and belonging to 
a deceased Washington resident provides Washington with a dominant 
interest.”208 
Another modern case, Hermanson v. Hermanson from Nevada, applied the 
state’s choice of law rules from contract209 to a divorce decree predicated on 
another status—legal paternity or legitimacy—that was traditionally governed 
by a choice of law principle analogous to that of “marital celebration”—“law 
of the child’s birthplace.”210  Key to the court’s determination that Nevada had 
“[more] significant contacts” than the birth-state of California, was that 
“California’s only relationship with [the] litigation [was] that [the child] was 
born there” and the parents “resided there during the three years that they 
cohabitated.”211 
A 1974 case, In re Estate of Lenherr, similarly applied its modern choice 
of law principles to a martial incident after separating the issue of status.212  
However, Lenherr has been repeatedly miscast by scholars writing about same-
sex marriage.213  According to Deborah Henson, for example, the Lenherr 
approach asks courts to determine whether the interests of the couple and the 
celebrating state trump, or outweigh, the interest of forum state.214 
The methodology of Lenherr is not as Henson has described.  
Pennsylvania is one of approximately six so-called hybrid modern states whose 
 
 207. Sessions, 940 P.2d at 268. 
 208. In re Estate of Shippy, 678 P.2d 848, 851 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). 
 209. Hermanson v. Hermanson, 887 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Nev. 1994) (citing Ferdie Sievers & 
Lake Tahoe Land Co., Inc. v. Diversified Mtg. Investors, 603 P.2d 270, 273 (Nev. 1979)). 
 210. Id. at 1244 n.2 (noting that a place of birth test “reflect[ed] a traditional conflict of laws 
approach which Nevada has rejected . . . .”). 
 211. Id. at 1244. 
 212. 314 A.2d 255, 258 (Pa. 1974). 
 213. See, e.g., KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 92–94; Henson, supra note 35, at 555–56; Cox, 
supra note 35, at 725–29.  Typically Lenherr is grouped together with In re Dalip Singh Bir’s 
Estate, 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948).  Yet, their respective analyses are quite different.  
In re Dalip Singh is a First Restatement case in which the court opts not to deploy a public policy 
objection to inheritance of a wife from a polygamous marriage.  188 P.2d at 502.  This approach 
closely parallels that of State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9 (Tenn. 1872), Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 
U.S. 202 (1933), and Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.) (which separated the 
incident from validity, as Yarborough suggested and Bell did, but found English public policy to 
be offended by the incident). 
 214. Henson, supra note 35, at 566.  Henson suggests that the case’s approach calls on the 
court to balance “the forum state’s policy against same-sex marriage . . . in relation to the 
particular incident of marriage at issue; e.g., inheritance by [a] surviving spouse . . . .”  Id.  Her 
personal view is that in terms of inheritance, the forum’s interest would not prevail, but with 
respect to the adoption of children, it would.  Id. 
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modern choice of law principle synthesizes “governmental interest analysis” 
with “a contacts or center of gravity” test.215  The issue was whether a second 
wife could receive an inheritance tax-free on the grounds that it came from her 
husband.216  After carrying on an affair with a married man, the woman had 
sought to marry him.217  Pennsylvania had a statute prohibiting “the marital 
partner guilty of adultery from marrying his or her paramour during the 
lifetime of the former spouse[,]” and another law that prohibited the issuance 
of a marital license for such a marriage.218  First, the State Supreme Court did a 
contact analysis and found that they decisively pointed to Pennsylvania: both 
husband and wife “were residents of Pennsylvania before and after their West 
Virginia marriage.”219  Then the court, in its interest analysis, interpreted the 
Pennsylvania law in question not as “a penalty upon the parties who failed to 
recognize the sanctity of the former marriage vow,” but rather as a statute 
“intended to protect the sensibilities of the injured spouse.”220  Conversely, 
West Virginia had an interest in recognizing a marriage validly celebrated in 
that state.221  In other words, in the parlance of Currie—the architect of interest 
analysis—“the court [found] that one state ha[d] an interest in the application 
of its policy in the circumstances of the case, and the other [State] ha[d] 
none.”222  In that situation, Currie wrote that the court “should apply the law of 
the only interested state,” which is what the Lenherr Court did by applying 
West Virginia law.223  Lenherr suggests that had the Pennsylvania statute 
barred remarriage to one’s paramour indefinitely—rather than only so long as 
the offended spouse lived—then the case’s holding would have been the 
reverse.224  That difference would have meant that the marriage was invalid in 
the eyes of the Pennsylvania court and thus the inheritance would have been 
taxed. 
Because the result in Lenherr permitted tax-free inheritance, which is what 
the foreign law counseled, it has been used by writers to further the argument 
 
 215. SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 302 (Table 6), 303 (characterizing Pennsylvania 
as following “a combination of interest analysis and the Restatement (Second)”). 
 216. Lenherr, 314 A.2d at 256. 
 217. Id. at 256–57. 
 218. Id. at 257. 
 219. Id. at 258. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 66, at 218 (citing David F. Cavers et al., 
Comments on Babcock v. Jackson: A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1212, 1242–43 (1963)). 
 223. Cavers et al., supra note 222, at 1242; see also Padula v. Lilan Properties Corp., 84 
N.Y.2d. 519 (N.Y. 1994) (declining to apply New York law, even though New York had the most 
significant contacts, because prior case law had established that New York had no governmental 
interest in the regulation of construction safety out of state). 
 224. Lenherr, 314 A.2d at 258–59. 
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that at a minimum, courts ought to recognize the incidents of marriage “for 
some purposes, even when they may be unwilling to recognize the status for all 
purposes.”225  They champion an incidents approach as a compromise between 
the recognition of status and total non-recognition; Koppelman has described it 
as an attempt “to consider the administrative question without resolving the 
normative one.”226  However, in the choice of law context the reasoning is as 
important, if not more important, than the holding.  Though same-sex 
advocates may favor the outcome of Lenherr, it is key not to lose sight of the 
fact that its result hinged on the court’s interpretation of the policy underlying 
the Pennsylvania law.  Had Pennsylvania been thought to have a governmental 
interest in applying its law, the court would then have faced a “true conflict” of 
laws—defined by Currie as “a conflict between the legitimate interests of the 
two states.”227  Currie recommended that a court in that situation “should apply 
the law of the forum.”228  However, this pro-forum bias has not been generally 
accepted in hybrid modern jurisdictions.  Instead, states typically follow the 
method of the New York Court of Appeals in Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. 
University of Houston.  The Ehrlich-Bober Court applied Texas law in a 
situation in which both Texas and New York had genuine governmental 
interests because Texas had the “most significant contacts.”229  Because 
Pennsylvania’s choice of law rule is essentially the same as New York’s,230 
Pennsylvania presumably would have applied its own law based upon a 
contacts rationale. 
An incident that most clearly illustrates the appropriate reasoning for 
choice of law controversies surrounding same-sex marriage is that of spousal 
standing to sue for death or injury of a legal partner.  The case of Langan v. St. 
Vincent’s (2005) has received considerable attention and criticism.  It held that 
a New York domiciliary, Neal Spicehandler, could not maintain an action for 
the wrongful death of his legal partner, John Langan—another New York 
domiciliary—with whom he had previously entered into a Vermont civil 
union.231  Koppelman has critiqued the majority opinion for putting dispositive 
weight on the fact that the couple had a civil union and the Vermont Supreme 
Court and legislature “went to great pains to expressly decline to place civil 
 
 225. Cox, supra note 35, at 729; see also SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 431; cf. 
Silberman, supra note 35, at 2195 (characterizing Cox’s Incidents of Marriage article as “far from 
neutral”). 
 226. KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 92. 
 227. BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 66, at 218. 
 228. Id. 
 229. The case identified “serv[ing] administrative convenience” as the interest of Texas and 
“administer[ing] a . . . commercially sophisticated body of law” as that of New York.  Ehrlich-
Bober & Co., Inc. v. Univ. of Houston 49 N.Y.2d 574, 575, 581 (N.Y. 1980). 
 230. See supra notes 61, 210 and accompanying text. 
 231. Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. of N.Y., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
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unions and marriage on an identical basis.”232  This critique is well founded as 
that was indeed “the wrong question to ask”233 because Vermont law granted 
full marital emoluments to its same-sex couples.234  Koppelman is also correct 
that “[h]aving decided that Vermont law was applicable, the court should then 
have asked, what would Vermont do in this situation?”235  However, what has 
escaped much scholarly attention is that the majority did not conduct a typical 
choice of law analysis to arrive at the “decision” that Vermont law was 
applicable. 
The St. Vincent’s partial concurrence236 illustrates a more rigorous 
application of New York choice of law precedent which abounds in the area of 
wrongful death.  In disagreeing that New York was “bound to afford the 
plaintiff the right to sue for wrongful death because the doctrine of comity 
requires recognition of the ‘spousal rights’ he derives from the laws of 
Vermont,” the Judge astutely declared that “th[e] case is not about 
marriage.”237  Instead, the concurrence notes that when the “incidents [of a 
civil status] conflict with New York law, our courts will generally decide 
whether to give them effect by looking to . . . choice of law principles.”238  
After noting that “New York has long chosen, as a matter of comity, to 
recognize a marriage considered valid in the place where it was celebrated,” 
the Judge explained that “recognition of a civil status validly created outside of 
New York does not . . . imply that [New York] will give effect to all of the 
legal incidents of that status conferred by the foreign jurisdiction that created 
it.”239 
The clearest proof that this framework, and the concurrence’s subsequent 
analysis, is legally correct is that it closely parallels prior choice of law 
jurisprudence, both on wrongful death and on incidents of personal status.  In 
reaching the threshold determination that incidents ought to be separated from 
the question of status, St Vincent’s relies on Matter of Chase (1987)240—a 
modern case concerning the inheritance rights of children from their natural 
parents after adoption.  In denying the right to inherit, the court found that 
although precedent dating back to 1910 illustrated that “New York, by the law 
of comity, must recognize [the childrens’] status as adopted,” the right to 
 
 232. Id. at 479; KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 100. 
 233. KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 100. 
 234. Langan, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 480–81. 
 235. KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 100. 
 236. The opinion by Judge Fisher is reported as a dissent because, though he determined that 
New York law should apply, he would have invalidated that law on equal protection grounds.  
Langan, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 486, 490 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 237. Id. at 484, 480. 
 238. Id. at 484–85. 
 239. Id. at 484. 
 240. In re Estate of Chase, 515 N.Y.S.2d 348, 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
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inherit should be governed by New York law, not Rhode Island which issued 
the adoption decree, since “Rhode Island ha[d] no [other] contacts with [the] 
case” and “New York was the domicile of decedent and New York ha[d] a 
strong interest in enforcing its statute regarding the inheritance rights of 
adopted children.”241 
Matter of Chase relies in part on the Restatement (Second) and is 
consonant with other status cases such as the Nevada case of Hermanson and 
the Pennsylvania decision of In re Lenherr.242  On the issue of wrongful death, 
the concurrence contrasted the traditional result obtained in Wooden v. Western 
(1891),243 with a modern wrongful death case of Padula v. Lilian Properties 
(1994).244  Wooden involved whether a New York court should apply 
Pennsylvania law which gave a widow standing to sue for wrongful death, or a 
New York law that did not.  Because the accident occurred in Pennsylvania, 
the court applied the principle of lex loci and allowed the widow’s suit to 
proceed.245  Today the jurisprudence is more complex; but perceiving St. 
Vincent’s as a same-sex marriage case obscures the genuine issue, which is 
which state—New York or Vermont—has a greater connection to the parties 
and the union (or marriage), such that its substantive law should apply.  The St. 
Vincent’s Court concluded that because both members of the same-sex couple 
were New York domiciliaries, the defendant hospital was a New York business 
and the accident occurred in New York, that “New York certainly has the most 
significant contacts with the case and, therefore, the stronger interest in 
applying the provisions of its own wrongful death law.”246 
In the St. Vincent’s case, the couple clearly “evaded” New York law since 
they were New York residents before and immediately after their Vermont 
civil union.  As discussed above, some theorists have suggested that it is the 
evasion that is the key factor that authorizes New York to decline to apply 
Vermont law on the facts of St. Vincent’s.247  However, when the case is 
 
 241. Id. at 349–50.  The governmental interest identified was that case law indicated the intent 
of the New York domestic relation law was “to sever all ties between the adopted child and his or 
her natural family.”  Id. at 350.  Rhode Island had a governmental interest as well but the 
“significant contacts” pointed to New York and thus New York law governed—and the child was 
denied inheritance.  Id. at 350. 
 242. See supra note 209, 212 and accompanying text. 
 243. Wooden v. Western N.Y. & P.R. Co., 26 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1891). 
 244. Padula v. Lilarn Properties Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001, 1002 (N.Y. 1994). 
 245. Wooden, 26 N.E. at 1051. 
 246. Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. of N.Y., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 485–86 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2005) (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 247. KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 102–06.  Recall also that Koppelman posits that a place 
of celebration rule with a public policy exception is the “modern” Restatement (Second) test for 
marriage and its incidents.  By virtue of this, Koppelman suggests that a state like New York may 
not be permitted to decline to recognize even in an evasion context because of the absence of a 
State DOMA.  Id. at 103. 
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oriented in the extant choice of law jurisprudence, it becomes clear that 
evasion is not dispositive, but rather that the holding of St. Vincent’s follows 
logically from an “interest and contact analysis” for a hybrid modern state such 
as New York.248  The distinction between that analysis and arriving at the 
result because it is an “evasion” case (similar to § 132) may at first seem 
merely academic.  However, which reasoning is used is outcome determinative 
in “migratory cases”—when a couple “contracted a marriage [or union] that 
was valid where they lived and subsequently moved to a state where it was 
prohibited.  An example would be a same-sex couple who lived in 
Massachusetts when they married and later moved to Pennsylvania.”249  It 
appears quite likely that the St. Vincent’s concurrence would have applied New 
York law to Langan’s suit even if he and his partner had migrated from 
Vermont to New York.  This stems from the fact that the couple had clearly 
decided to establish their married life in New York, as well as from the 
conclusion that Vermont had not expressed a governmental interest in having 
its wrongful death provision carry extraterritorial effect.  The latter judgment 
might seem surprising; however St. Vincent’s cites a New York case, Padula v. 
Lilarn Properties, which bears out the pragmatic principle that states do not 
typically seek to regulate standards of care or conduct outside their borders.250 
IV.  INCIDENTS OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE ACROSS DIVERGENT CHOICE OF LAW 
JURISDICTIONS 
A. How Cases Should Be and Are Being Decided 
If the fact pattern of St. Vincent’s were modified such that the couple had 
been Vermont domiciliaries merely passing through New York, then it seems 
clear that virtually any modern jurisdiction—without a statutory or 
Constitutional DOMA251—would have applied Vermont law to their situation. 
 
 248. See Memorandum from Douglas F. Gansler, Md. Att’y Gen., to Hon. Richard S. 
Madaleno, Md. Senate 47 (Feb. 23, 2010), available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/metro/documents/95oag3.pdf (questioning whether Maryland’s Court of Appeals would adopt 
Koppelman’s analytical categories for foreign marriages); see also infra Part IV.A. which 
discusses the approach that hews closely to precedent in other types of choice of law jurisdictions 
(i.e., Vermont’s “pure contacts” and Rhode Island’s “traditional”); Letter from Patrick Lynch, 
supra note 122 (analyzing Ex Parte Chace, 58 A. 978 (R.I. 1904), to conclude same). 
 249. KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 106. 
 250. Padula v. Lilarn Properties Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001, 1002 (N.Y. 1994) (quoting Cooney 
v. Osgood Machinery, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 280 (N.Y. 1993) (“[T]he law of the jurisdiction 
where the tort occurred will generally apply because that jurisdiction has the greatest interest in 
regulating behavior in its borders.”)). 
 251. See supra Part II.  Of course, a public policy exception could too result in non-
recognition.  See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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An analogous fact pattern from the 1988 case of Nelson v. Hix, concerning 
the right of a wife to sue her husband for a tort injury, illustrates the point.252  
Nelson concerned a Canadian couple who had been married there and was 
visiting relatives in Illinois.253  On the trip, the husband was driving a vehicle, 
with his wife as a passenger, and had an accident causing serious injuries to 
both.254  The wife sued the husband and he pled interspousal immunity under 
Illinois law—the place where the accident had occurred.255  In deciding 
whether Illinois law should bar the suit or whether it should proceed under 
Canadian law, the Illinois Supreme Court, considering § 145 (governing torts) 
and § 6 of the Restatement (Second), concluded that “the domicile of the 
parties and the place where their marital relationship was centered is . . . more 
important to a resolution of the issue than where the accident and injury 
occurred.”256  The prioritizing of domicile as one of the most salient contacts 
lends further support to the observation made above, that had the couple in St. 
Vincent’s migrated to New York, then New York law appropriately would 
have governed the wrongful death suit.257  Nelson not only illustrates how an 
application of ordinary choice of law precedent will protect same-sex couples 
while they travel throughout the country, but it also illustrates a common-sense 
principle that the place of the parties’ domicile and the state of the marital 
relationship are the “most significant contacts.”258  As the case explained, the 
“[s]tate of domicile . . . has the primary responsibility for establishing and 
regulating the incidents of the family relationship.”259 
The Vermont Supreme Court in Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins properly 
held that its modern choice of law rules should apply to the incident of parental 
visitation rights stemming from a same-sex civil union.260  Vermont uses a 
version of the Restatement (Second) for choice of law questions, focusing on 
the state where the case’s “center of gravity” or “grouping of contacts” is 
located.261  The case involved a custody dispute between the biological mother 
of a child and her same-sex partner with whom she had a Vermont civil 
 
 252. 522 N.E.2d 1214, 1214 (Ill. 1988). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 1215. 
 256. Id. at 1217. 
 257. See text accompanying notes 233–259. 
 258. Singer, supra note 17, at 26.  “[I]t is elementary conflict of laws reasoning that the 
current domicile of the parties is almost certain to be the state that has the most significant 
relationship with the parties and the transaction.”  Id. 
 259. Nelson, 522 N.E.2d at 1218 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 260. 912 A.2d 951, 971 (Vt. 2006). 
 261. SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 301–302 (Map 1, 2 & Table 6); see also Myers 
v. Langlois, 721 A.2d 129, 130 (Vt. 1998) (cited in Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 971). 
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union.262  The biological mother had received an exclusive custody order in 
Virginia, while the other woman had invoked a federal law—the Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act (“PKPA”) designed to avert interstate 
jurisdictional battles over children—to receive a joint-custody order from a 
Vermont court.263  The biological mother argued, inter alia, that the other 
woman’s parental status, with respect to the incident of custody, should be 
governed by Virginia law—a state that neither recognized nor permitted such 
unions.264  The court followed 1998 precedent that involved whether Vermont 
or Canadian law should govern an automobile accident, and determined that 
Vermont law should apply to the parental status, meaning that it would be 
recognized.265 
Thus, to summarize, a “grouping of contacts” jurisdiction—such as 
Vermont—will essentially resolve same-sex incident controversies in the same 
manner as hybrid modern jurisdictions discussed above, such as Pennsylvania 
and New York.  However, contacts analysis can lead to more predictable 
results, ex ante, because it only demands that a court “count contacts,” and 
then determine which is most significant to the controversy.  As the New York 
Court of Appeals explained, the “‘grouping of contacts’ choice of law 
theory . . . enables the court to identify which law to apply without entering 
into the difficult, and sometimes inappropriate, policy thicket.”266  Although 
conflicts scholars have noted that for complex tort and contract disputes, 
contacts analysis rarely is dispositive267 because the parties’ domicile and their 
marital home state are so obviously “significant contacts,” the appropriate 
outcome is far more evident when choice of law principles are applied to same-
sex incidents.268 
A different and far less complex analysis is appropriate for traditional 
jurisdictions without a statutory or constitutional DOMA.269  Rhode Island is 
 
 262. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 955–56. 
 263. Id. at 957. 
 264. Id. at 971. 
 265. Id.  In reaching that conclusion, it put conclusive weight on the congressional 
requirement for state court jurisdiction under the PKPA.  Effectively it determined that if a state 
met Congress’ requirements to issue a PKPA order, then by virtue of that, it became “the state 
with the most significant relationship to [the] child custody or visitation dispute.”  Id. 
 266. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stolarz, 613 N.E.2d 936, 939 (N.Y. 1993). 
 267. See, e.g., Phillips v. General Motors Corp., 995 P.2d 1002 (Mont. 2000).  Phillips is a tort 
case in which the contacts pointed towards at least three states, with none being obviously 
decisive: the accident involved Montana domiciliaries, the defective vehicle had crashed in 
Kansas, it was manufactured in Michigan, and had been sold in North Carolina.  Id. at 1005, 1011. 
 268. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 248, 259 (discussing Langan v. St. Vincent’s 
and Nelson v. Hix). 
 269. This could be salient in Rhode Island, Wyoming, New Mexico, and Maryland.  
SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 301.  Many of the other “traditional” choice of law states 
have statutory or constitutional DOMAs in place. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] THE MISSING INGREDIENT 367 
such a state,270 and in Chambers v. Ormiston, its Supreme Court confronted the 
question of whether to recognize a valid Massachusetts same-sex marriage for 
the purpose of granting a divorce.271  Litigants and amici on both sides of the 
case agreed that “the well-settled rule of law [for Rhode Island] . . . remain[ed] 
that the validity of a marriage is determined by the law of the place where 
celebrated.”272  As Symeonides notes in his text on conflicts, Rhode Island 
follows the traditional conflict of laws approach.273  This conclusion flows 
from a 1904 case, Ex Parte Chace.274  Therefore, the analysis that this article 
has heretofore critiqued as inappropriate in light of the modern conflicts 
revolution—(1) whether the marriage was valid where celebrated; and if so, (2) 
whether it violates a fundamental public policy—is entirely apt for Rhode 
Island, a traditional choice of law state.  Based upon an analysis like that 
Virginia deployed in the 1993 case of Farah v. Farah,275 Rhode Island should 
have recognized the Massachusetts marriage’s validity and all its incidents.276  
This is not to suggest, however, that the Chambers majority was wrong to 
dismiss the case.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court was correct that “the 
common law concept of ‘comity’ . . . do[es] not come into play if the court 
lacks jurisdiction over the case before it.”277  The Connecticut Appellate 
 
 270. SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 300 (the author also states that Rhode Island 
“appear[s] ready to abandon [the approach] on the first available opportunity.”).  However, 
because Chambers did not reach the question and the dissent stated that in terms of marriage, the 
traditional rule was “well-settled,” this article treats Rhode Island as a traditional choice of law 
state. 
 271. 935 A.2d 956, 956 (R.I. 2007).  The special complexities regarding divorce as an incident 
are discussed in Section IV.B infra. 
 272. Id. at 972 (Suttell, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae National Legal 
Foundation on a Certified Question of Law, Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007) 
(No. 06-340); Brief of Amicus Curiae Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders on a Certified 
Question of Law from the Family Court, Chambers v Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007) (No. 
06-340), available at http://www.glad.org/work/cases/chambers-v-ormiston/. 
 273. SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 300. 
 274. Ex Parte Chace, 58 A. 978 (R.I. 1904).  Ex Parte Chace concerned the standing of a 
man’s putative wife to petition for his release on a writ of habeas corpus.  Id. at 978.  The adult 
husband had, prior to his marriage, been given a legal guardian “on the ground that from [lack] of 
discretion in managing his estate, he was likely to bring himself to want.”  Id. at 979.  Under 
Rhode Island law an individual under “guardianship” could not marry, but the man faced no such 
disability in Massachusetts where he and a woman celebrated their marriage.  Id.  Based upon lex 
celebrationis the Rhode Island Supreme Court recognized the marriage and permitted the petition 
to proceed.  Id. at 982. 
 275. See supra notes 136–140 and accompanying text. 
 276. See Letter from Patrick Lynch, supra note 122 (analyzing Chace, 58 A. 978, to conclude 
same).  But see Part IV.B. infra, discussing a forum’s ability to use forum law with respect to the 
incident of divorce. 
 277. Chambers, 935 A.2d at 963 n.14.  The court concluded, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, that the family court, as “a court of limited jurisdiction[,]” was incompetent to 
entertain the same-sex action.  Id. at 958.  As a result, the Chambers majority declined to reach 
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Court—before the state Supreme Court declared same-sex marriage a 
constitutional right278—similarly declined to reach the choice of law issue 
because of the limited jurisdiction of the adjudicating court.279 
New York courts confronted a number of same-sex incident cases that 
merit examination.  Langan v. State Farm Insurance Co., involving the same 
plaintiff as in St. Vincent’s, posed the question—this time before the Supreme 
Court, Third Appellate Department—whether New York or Vermont law 
should govern a claim for worker’s compensation for a same-sex spouse.280  In 
deciding to apply New York law, the court appropriately relied on the St. 
Vincent’s concurrence rather than the flawed approach of the majority 
opinion.281  The State Farm court held that “[a]lthough we may recognize the 
civil union status of claimant and decedent as a matter of comity, we are not 
thereby bound to confer upon them all the legal incidents of that status 
recognized in the foreign jurisdiction that created the relationship.”282  This is 
not merely an accurate explanation of the state’s conflicts jurisprudence; the 
statement elucidates the policy-making flexibility that modern choice of law 
rules offer with regard to same-sex marriage and union incidents.  In the view 
of the State Farm Court “the extension of benefits entails a consideration of 
social and fiscal policy more appropriately left to the legislature.”283 
Regardless of one’s opinions on the appropriate division of authority 
between the judiciary and the legislative and executive branches, it is 
demonstrably true that modern choice of law jurisdiction will lead to a more 
nuanced and calibrated approach to the incidents of same-sex marriage and 
unions.  For example, after State Farm and St. Vincent’s, same-sex couples 
domiciled in New York cannot sue for wrongful death.  The legislature did not 
act to alter that result until it implicitly did so by broadening marriage to 
include same-sex couples.284  Conversely, in other areas, state officials had 
conferred recognition of incidents through the exercise of their policy-making 
authority.  To illustrate, the State Comptroller had decided to extend spousal 
 
either the choice of law issues that had been heavily briefed, or the U.S. Constitutional issues of 
Full Faith and Credit.  Id. at 963 n.14.  It is beyond the scope of this article to conclude whether 
the jurisdictional holding was correct as a matter of Rhode Island law.  Although the disposition 
of Chambers is similar to B.S. v. F.B. (infra note 309) and the other cases discussed infra, its 
reasoning is radically different because, for courts without subject matter jurisdiction, questions 
about which substantive law to apply are rendered moot. 
 278. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 407 (Conn. 2008). 
 279. See generally Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002). 
 280. 849 N.Y.S.2d 105, 107–08 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. See Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 95 (McKinney) (effective July 24, 
2011). 
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benefits to out-of-state employees with valid foreign same-sex marriages.285  
Also recall that, before being rendered moot by judicial determination,286 New 
Jersey legislators had opted to grant some civil union benefits, but to a less 
extensive degree than that conferred by Vermont.  By contrast, in a traditional 
choice of law jurisdiction (i.e., Rhode Island), same-sex incidents will either 
receive wholesale recognition, or be completely denied by virtue of a deep 
seated public policy exception. 
Other same-sex cases in New York mostly have concerned the incident of 
divorce287 and rely on jurisprudence citing back to a well known 1953 Court of 
Appeals decision, In re May’s Estate, that predates the conflict revolution.288  
When May’s articulated the place of celebration rule, it cited the Restatement 
(First), Beale’s Treatise, and several cases from the 1880s as authority.289  
Without any reference to the intervening conflicts revolution, in 2008, the 
Martinez v. County of Monroe court applied language from May’s, to hold that 
the plaintiff’s Canadian same-sex marriage must be recognized by her public 
employer for the purpose of spousal health benefits.290 
Subsequent pre-legalization cases misguidedly followed suit,291 including a 
2008 case—C.M. v. C.C.292—that recognized a Massachusetts same-sex 
marriage for the purpose of divorce, without engaging New York State’s 
hybrid interest and contacts choice of law principles.  The C.M. court 
purported to distinguish St. Vincent’s and State Farm on the grounds that those 
 
 285. Godfrey v. DiNapoli, 866 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).  Additionally, the 
New York Governor decided to recognize Canadian and other state same-sex marriage for the 
purposes of various benefits within his discretion.  Golden v. Patterson, 877 N.Y.S.2d 822, 825 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
 286. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 220–21 (N.J. 2006). 
 287. As with the discussion of Chambers, this discussion does not consider the possibility of 
eschewing ordinary choice of law analysis for the incident of divorce and applying forum law.  A 
discussion of a possible justification for such an approach is discussed infra Part IV.B. 
 288. See In re May’s Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953) (Auten v. Auten would be handed 
down the following year); BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 66, at 57–65 (situating May’s 
with a 1908 Wisconsin decision and other Restatement (First) decisions on marriage); see also 
Leszinske v. Poole, 798 P.2d 1049, 1053 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (relying on May’s Estate for the 
rule that “a marriage valid when and where celebrated is valid anywhere.”).  New Mexico still 
adheres to the traditional approach for both contracts and tort conflicts of law.  SYMEONIDES ET 
AL., supra note 9, at 301–02. 
 289. May’s Estate, 114 N.E.2d at 6. 
 290. 850 N.Y.S.2d 740, 742 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008). 
 291. See, e.g., Beth R. v. Donna M, 853 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).  Interestingly, in 
2009 New York’s high court declined to bless the reasoning of these lower courts in adhering to 
May’s, finding it “unnecessary to reach [the] argument that New York’s common-law marriage 
recognition rule is a proper basis for the challenged recognition of out-of-state same-sex 
marriages.”  Godfrey v. Spano, 13 N.Y.3d 358, 377 (N.Y. 2009). 
 292. 867 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
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cases involved a civil union rather than a marriage.293  Yet, as should be clear 
by now, that distinction is immaterial, and at the time these cases should have 
been resolved with reference to modern choice of law rules.294  As several 
conflicts scholars critically wrote regarding May’s, it is fair to say that these 
modern New York cases “have[] . . . missed the real point . . . [since] the 
ultimate issue [is not] the validity of the marriage.295 
In addition to May’s, some of these cases rely on both modern and 
traditional cases concerning the common law marriages to support their 
holdings.  The 2001 case of In re Landolfi—decided by the Second Appellate 
Department (the same court as Langan v. St. Vincent’s)—illustrates that the lex 
loci rule lives on in New York regarding “common law” marriages.  These are 
marriages that do not involve a “celebration,” and are typically recognized 
after a given period of spousal cohabitation.  As alluded to earlier, the genesis 
of the place of marital celebration rule was the notion that form should not 
trump substance in terms of interstate recognition.  The Restatement (Second) 
§ 283 states that: 
the state where the marriage was celebrated, or, in the case of a common law 
marriage, the state where the parties cohabitated while holding themselves out 
to be man and wife, is the state which will be usually be primarily concerned 
with the question of formalities.  . . . If the requirements of [that] state have 
been complied with, the marriage will not be held invalid in other states for 
lack of the necessary formalities . . . .296 
As the Restatement continues, “[w]hether a marriage can be created without 
formal ceremony is a question relating to formalities . . . [and] a marriage 
without ceremony is commonly called a common law marriage.”297  In other 
words, a common law marriage is the quintessential example of mere formal 
variation with which states are not thought to be concerned, and thus those 
precedents should not be conflated with those pertaining to other marriage and 
status cases.  As a prominent conflict of laws scholar has observed, cases 
involving common law marriages “are irrelevant to the same-sex marriage 
debate because they involve formal rather than substantive marriage 
conditions.  Formal marriage conditions do not elicit strong public policy 
objections.”298 
 
 293. Id. at 887 n.2. 
 294. Supra note 193 (discussing Seth v. Seth); see also Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 920 S.W.2d 
776 (Tex. App. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 968 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. 1998). 
 295. BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 66, at 68. 
 296. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 cmt. f (1971) (emphasis added). 
 297. Id. cmt. g. 
 298. KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 185 n.11 (emphasis added) (distinguishing Louisiana 
common law marriage cases from a Full Faith and Credit analysis regarding same-sex marriage). 
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B. Possible Complexities Regarding the Incident of Divorce 
Until now, this article has not addressed the unique issues concerning 
divorce because that discussion was previously of only academic interest for 
two reasons.  First, the judicial opinions concerning the entertaining of divorce 
proceedings have not distinguished it as an incident meriting a special 
analysis.299  Second, once a party has secured a divorce judgment or decree in 
one state—unlike in terms of marital status—the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
demands full recognition.300  However, the federal DOMA invites states to 
decline recognition of such judgments pertaining to same-sex relationships, 
and various states have exercised that putative authority.  Because of the 
plethora of constitutional issues, anything beyond a cursory sketch of the 
pertinent issues would be beyond the scope of this article. 
1. Entertaining Divorce Actions 
Preliminarily, while most states encountering divorce regarding same-sex 
marriage have engaged in either the modern analysis, discussed throughout this 
article, or a traditional lex loci celebrationis methodology—there is a third way 
that might be more appropriate.  As Restatement (Second) § 285 notes, “the 
local law of the domiciliary state in which the action is brought will be applied 
to determine the right to divorce.”301  Comment a explains that: 
The same considerations which give a state judicial jurisdiction to divorce a 
domiciliary make it appropriate for the state to apply its local law to determine 
the grounds upon which the divorce shall be granted.302 The local law of the 
forum determines the right to divorce, not because it is the place where the 
action is brought but because of the peculiar interest which a state has in the 
marriage of its domiciliaries.303 
As Symeonides explains, the question of “[w]hich state’s law should govern 
the right to obtain a divorce . . . for the last three decades of the 20th Century, 
had lost much of its relevance in the United States as state divorce laws 
gradually converged at the lowest common denominator.”304  However, with 
the emergence of a multiplicity of laws regarding same-sex marriages and civil 
unions—the question again arises. 
 
 299. See Chambers v. Ormiston, Seth v. Seth, and C.M. v. C.C discussed supra. 
 300. BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 66, at 641, 701–21. 
 301. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 285 (1971). 
 302. Simply stated, in a number of decisions, including Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 
U.S. 226, 229 (1945), the high court has held that “judicial power to grant a divorce . . . is 
founded on domicile.”  SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 772.  In essence, this means that 
either marital party may obtain an ex parte divorce from any state in which he or she establishes 
domicile. 
 303. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 285 cmt. a (1971). 
 304. SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 430 (emphasis added). 
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Can a state without domestic same-sex marriage, for example, decline to 
entertain a divorce action, not on the grounds that choice of law principles 
necessitate the application of forum law, but merely because forum law does 
not create a cause of action for same-sex divorce, or for the dissolution of a 
union or partnership?  In Williams v. North Carolina (1942), the Supreme 
Court implicitly sanctioned that practice by not disturbing the State of 
Nevada’s application of its divorce law to a marriage celebrated in North 
Carolina.305  In line with Restatement (Second) § 285 and Williams, “American 
courts virtually always apply forum law in divorce actions.”306  Comparing the 
2006 New York case Gonzalez v. Green307 with another New York case from 
2009, B.S. v. F.B.,308 illustrates the uncertainty about the appropriate method 
for determining what law to apply.309  The question in B.S. was “whether a civil 
union contracted in the state of Vermont may be dissolved by way of a 
matrimonial proceeding commenced in New York.”310  In Gonzalez, the court 
faced “an ‘Action For A Divorce’” concerning a Massachusetts same-sex 
marriage by two New York domicilaries.311  The Gonzalez court granted the 
defendant’s Order to Show Cause for summary judgment, which “dismissed 
plaintiff’s [divorce] action for failure to state a cause of action.”312  The court 
arrived at that conclusion by immediately applying New York Domestic 
Relations Law § 170, without explanation.313  Contrastingly, in B.S., the court 
remarked that “[t]he dissolution cases present the classic conflict-of-laws 
problem” and applied the precedent of St. Vincent’s, focusing on the fact that 
the two parties petitioning for the divorce were both New York domicilaires.314  
Based on that analysis, the court applied New York law and found that—
although a comparable Vermont statute would have permitted dissolution315—
 
 305. 317 U.S. 287, 292–93 (1942). 
 306. DAVID VERNON, LOUISE WEINBERG, WILLIAM REYNOLDS & WILLIAM RICHMAN, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 819 (2d ed. 2002) (observing further 
that “the revolution in choice of law theory . . . bypassed altogether the field of divorce.”). 
 307. 831 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). 
 308. 883 N.Y.S.2d 459, 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).  The cases discussed supra in notes 287–
294 and the accompanying text are in line with the typical approach in same-sex dissolution cases 
typified by B.S. v. F.B.—which is to treat divorce identically to how the court would approach 
other incidents. 
 309. See B.S., 883 N.Y.S.2d at 461. 
 310. Id. at 462. 
 311. Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 858. 
 312. Id. at 858–59. 
 313. Supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
 314. B.S., 883 N.Y.S.2d at 463–64. 
 315. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2010). 
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New York Domestic Relations Law § 170 did not authorize the dissolution of a 
civil union.316  Consequently the suit was dismissed.317 
While the result of Gonzales and B.S. would be identical under either a 
“choice of law” approach or immediate application of forum law—one can 
imagine at least two scenarios in which the methodology chosen could change 
the disposition.  First, both parties in a same-sex couple could be visiting a 
state for the requisite period under local law to be eligible for divorce (but 
without having established domicile there).  Second, the methodology applied 
could be dispositive in an ex parte situation in which the plaintiff is a 
domiciliary of the forum but the court’s choice of law analysis determines that 
on balance the most significant interests or contacts favor another state.318  
However, as Symeonides has observed, under a pre-Williams regime the only 
forum capable of granting divorce was the state of celebration (i.e. “the 
matrimonial domicile”).319  In other words, the forum and the state of 
celebration were one in the same.  It is an open question whether it is 
intellectually sound to continue to apply the law of the forum or whether the 
choice most consistent with logic and precedent is to treat the availability of 
divorce like any other incident.  Ex parte and non-domiciliary cases have not 
yet arisen in the courts, but as the number of same-sex marriages and unions 
increases, whether forum law is always applied, or only when dictated by the 
jurisdiction’s modern choice of law principle, will become increasingly 
important. 
 
 316. Id. at 464.  The court’s statutory interpretation focused on the distinction between 
“marriage” (the word in N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 2004)) and “civil union”; yet one 
would expect that a divorce action regarding a same-sex marriage would statutorily be barred on the 
same grounds.  Cf. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2006) (concluding that despite the 
“Domestic Relations Law, which govern[s] marriage, nowhere say[ing] in so many words that 
only people of different sexes may marry each other, . . . New York’s statutory law clearly limits 
marriage to opposite-sex couples.”). 
 317. B.S., 883 N.Y.S.2d at 467.  The court suggested that the couple might re-file their family 
court petition in the New York Supreme Court.  Id.  That forum, the Judge intimated, although 
likewise unable to entertain a divorce action, and possibly unable to officially dissolve their 
union, might be able to use equitable authority to help resolve their affairs (i.e. property 
settlements).  Id.; cf. Salucco v. Aldredge, No. 02E00876c1, 2004 WL 864459 (Mass. Super. 
Mar. 19, 2004) (suggesting similar).  However, this solution still presumes that New York Law 
(i.e. case law on judicial equitable power) would apply and thus does not shed light on the choice of 
law analysis. 
 318. Of course, if both parties have moved their domicile to the forum (a “bilateral divorce”) 
then the result under modern choice of law principles would likely point to forum law—thus 
rendering the question academic.  Additionally, the issue might be salient in traditional choice of 
law states without a DOMA, because if the notion that forum law should govern a divorce action 
is valid, then those traditional states could decline the incident of divorce even though they would 
be compelled based on lex loci principles to recognize all other same-sex incidents. 
 319. SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 9, at 430. 
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2. Judgments Concerning Divorce320 
“As a general matter, the full faith and credit guarantee has been 
interpreted to require that each state must treat the judgment of a sister state as 
it would be treated in the state in which the judgment was rendered.”321  
Therefore, divorce judgments from one state are generally enforceable in any 
state.  As Restatement (Second) § 117 summarizes, “[a] valid judgment 
rendered in one State of the United States will be recognized and enforced in a 
sister State even though the strong public policy of the latter State would have 
precluded . . . the original claim.”322  Thus, not only does choice of law 
doctrine not have a place in the analysis, but the fundamental public policy 
exception is not available.  As a result, if same-sex couples obtain judgments in 
the context of divorce or dissolution proceedings, other states would be 
constitutionally compelled to award them recognition.323  However, as noted 
above, the federal “DOMA [purports to] relieve the states of a duty to enforce 
judgments related to same-sex marriages.”324 
In the context of a “sustained evaluation of the congressional role in 
horizontal federalism,” Professor Gillian Metzger, writing in the Harvard Law 
Review, concludes that DOMA, as applied to judgments, “fall[s] within 
Congress’s [constitutional] power” under the Effects Clause of Article IV.325  
Another scholar, David Currie, takes the position that DOMA is 
unconstitutional as applied to judgments.326  Even if DOMA were repealed or 
struck down as unconstitutional, states would nonetheless continue to be free 
to apply their common law, statutory, or constitutional choice of law principles 
as individuals bring their “migrating marriages and civil unions to court . . . 
[and] they seek divorces, dissolutions and they seek benefits.”327 
 
 320. This article does not consider the possibility of declaratory judgments.  For an insightful 
discussion of the issues concerning the use of this mechanism to avoid conflict of law analysis and 
to “prevent states from refusing to recognize [same-sex] marriages,” see MARK STRASSER, THE 
CHALLENGE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FEDERALIST PRINCIPLES AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTIONS 115 (1999).  As Strasser notes, these judgments cannot easily be used as an end-run 
around choice of law principles because there must be a genuine legal controversy.  Id. at 116. 
 321. Id. at 102. 
 322. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (1971). 
 323. Under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, parties are able to avoid 
filing a new action to enforce an out-of-state judgment.  “Under the Act, the holder of a properly 
authenticated judgment from one jurisdiction may file the judgment in another jurisdiction with 
the clerk of the court.  Once filed . . . the judgment is then treated as a local judgment.”  Id. at 723. 
 324. BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 66, at 688. 
 325. Metzger, supra note 60, at 1475, 1535. 
 326. David P. Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Marriages, 1 GREEN BAG 7, 8 (1997). 
 327. B.S. v. F.B., 883 N.Y.S.2d 459, 463 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).  See supra notes 59–67 and 
accompanying text (explaining the likely irrelevance of DOMA’s inter-state provisions). 
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V.  THE SCOPE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND UNIONS AND THE QUESTION OF 
A FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT 
Unless the Supreme Court were to rule that the Constitution demands that 
states issue same-sex marriage licenses, the issue of a federal marriage 
amendment will continue to implicate significantly choice of law 
considerations.328  In 2004, President Bush endorsed the Marriage Protection 
Amendment and the House and Senate held votes on it.  The Amendment read: 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a 
woman.  Neither this constitution nor the constitution of any state, nor state or 
federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal 
incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.329 
This proposed constitutional amendment has been reintroduced several 
times and most recently in the 112th Congress in 2011.330  As described by 
one of its lead drafters, it would only extinguish same-sex marriage from 
states where it exists due to judicial action,331 while leaving state legislatures, 
or the people through referendums, free to enact it.332  Therefore, were the 
amendment to be ratified, same-sex marriage would continue in New 
Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington D.C., while it would be 
eliminated in the three states where courts mandated its institution.333 
As to any jurisdiction that democratically enacted same-sex marriage, the 
Marriage Protection Amendment would act as a blanket non-recognition 
choice of law rule.334  Therefore, every state—much like Georgia and Texas 
 
 328. Were the Court to pronounce such a constitutional right, the resulting national uniformity 
(i.e., 50 state celebration of same-sex marriages) would moot the choice of law issues. 
 329. Carl Hulse, Senators Block Initiative to Ban Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 
2004, at A1. 
 330. Marriage Protection Amendment, H.R. Res. 45, 112th Cong. (2011).  The 2011 proposed 
amendment contained the language “any union other than the union of a man and a woman” 
instead of the “upon unmarried couples or groups” language in the 2004 version.  Id.  Though 
other amendment texts exist, see, for example, H.R.J. Res. 37, 111 Cong. (2009), this article 
considers only the 2004 version because more information is available concerning it, and it is 
presumably the most politically viable text since it is the only version to ever have come to a 
congressional vote. 
 331. See Robert George, The 28th Amendment, NATIONAL REVIEW, July 23, 2001 at 32 (“The 
second sentence seeks to prevent the judicial abuse of statutory or constitutional law to force the 
extension of marriage to include non-marital relationships.”). 
 332. Id. (“The Amendment is intended to return the debate over the legal status of marriage to 
the American people—where it belongs.”). 
 333. Supra note 14; see U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme law 
of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or 
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 334. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
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today335—would be compelled to deny recognition to “martial status [and] 
legal incidents”336 of other states’ same-sex marriages. 
While the decision to constitutionally reverse the judgment of the states 
with judicial same-sex marriage is a normative and political issue beyond the 
scope of this article, proponents and opponents of the amendment ought to 
appreciate how (if enacted) it would alter the landscape from what this article 
has argued is counseled by existing state precedent.337 
In terms of choice of law, the amendment’s effect would be relatively 
modest.  Though it would reverse the rule in traditional states without a 
statutory or constitutional DOMA—there are extremely few such states.338  By 
contrast, most states follow a modern choice of law approach, and for them, 
the effect would be limited.  Generally speaking, these jurisdictions—should 
they follow the approaches argued for in this article—will recognize most 
incidents (even when they are not available in the forum) when one or both of 
the same-sex plaintiffs are domiciliaries of the state where the union or 
marriage was celebrated. This is because, ordinarily, the grouping of contacts 
or governmental interests tests will point to the state where the couple makes 
their permanent home.  Conversely, these modern choice of law states are 
unlikely to recognize same-sex incidents after an out-of-state couple takes up 
domicile in the forum, for the same reason.339  Therefore, the only effect of the 
Marriage Protection Amendment would be to foreclose recognition when a 
couple temporarily travels, but does not relocate, to a state without same-sex 
marriage or civil unions.340 
The fact that the contours of access to same-sex incidents would be similar 
from a nationwide perspective with or without the amendment341 highlights 
that, notwithstanding the calls  for new normatively laden choice of law rules, 
a faithful obeisance  to  existing  precedent  will  result  in  an  outcome  more  
respectful  of democratic-choice than advocates on the right posit, and more 
rational and fair than advocates of the left fear. 
 
 
 335. Supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 336. Supra note 329 and accompanying text. 
 337. Supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 338. See, e.g., Issues by State, DOMA WATCH, available at http://www.domawatch.org/state 
issues/index.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2011).  Rhode Island would be in this category but for the 
Chambers decision as to subject matter jurisdiction.  Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 967 
(R.I. 2007). 
 339. The treatment of these “migratory” cases is the single biggest difference between the 
approach that Koppelman suggests and that which this article suggests follows from modern 
choice of law precedent.  See KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 86; supra Part III. 
 340. Marriage Protection Amendment, supra note 330. 
 341. Id. 
